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ARTICLES
REGULATORY GOLDILOCKS: FINDING THE
JUST AND RIGHT FIT FOR CONTENT
MODERATION ON SOCIAL
PLATFORMS
by: Nina I. Brown*
ABSTRACT
Social media is a valuable tool that has allowed its users to connect and
share ideas in unprecedented ways. But this ease of communication has also
opened the door for rampant abuse. Indeed, social networks have become
breeding grounds for hate speech, misinformation, terrorist activities, and
other harmful content. The COVID-19 pandemic, growing civil unrest, and
the polarization of American politics have exacerbated the toxicity in recent
months and years.
Although social platforms engage in content moderation, the criteria for de-
termining what constitutes harmful content is unclear to both their users and
employees tasked with removing it. This lack of transparency has afforded
social platforms the flexibility of removing content as it suits them: in the way
that best maximizes their profits. But it has also inspired little confidence in
social platforms’ ability to solve the problem independently and has left legis-
lators, legal scholars, and the general public calling for a more aggressive—
and often a government-led—approach to content moderation.
The thorn in any effort to regulate content on social platforms is, of course,
the First Amendment. With this in mind, a variety of different options have
been suggested to ameliorate harmful content without running afoul of the
Constitution. Many legislators have suggested amending or altogether repeal-
ing section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Section 230 is a valuable
legal shield that immunizes internet service providers—like social platforms—
from liability for the content that users post. This approach would likely re-
duce the volume of online abuses, but it would also have the practical effect of
stifling harmless—and even socially beneficial—dialogue on social media.
While there is a clear need for some level of content regulation for social
platforms, the risks of government regulation are too great. Yet the current
self-regulatory scheme has failed in that it continues to enable an abundance
of harmful speech to persist online. This Article explores these models of regu-
lation and suggests a third model: industry self-regulation. Although there is
some legal scholarship on social media content moderation, none explore such
a model. As this Article will demonstrate, an industry-wide governance model
is the optimal solution to reduce harmful speech without hindering the free
exchange of ideas on social media.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V8.I3.1
* Assistant Professor, S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications; J.D.,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Not long after the COVID-19 pandemic reached the United States,
false information about the virus began appearing on social platforms.
Videos and articles spread across Facebook and Twitter that touted at-
home “breath-holding” tests as reliable alternatives to medical test-
ing.1 A false memo circulated on Facebook claimed that consuming
alcoholic drinks prevented the coronavirus.2 False claims suggesting
the virus was caused by and transmitted through 5G networks sur-
1. Audrey Cher, Don’t Hold Your Breath. Experts Debunk Dangerous Myths
About the Coronavirus, CNBC (May 1, 2020, 3:29 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/
05/01/experts-explain-why-coronavirus-myths-misinformation-can-be- dangerous.html
[https://perma.cc/N4M2-TFQR].
2. Arijeta Lajka, Consuming Alcoholic Drinks Does Not Prevent the
Coronavirus, AP NEWS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://apnews.com/afs:Content:8709292273
[https://perma.cc/Q3AK-UR2E].
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faced across social platforms.3 That these falsehoods could spread so
easily is no surprise: social media has long been a breeding ground for
misinformation and other harmful speech.4 The surprise was that so-
cial platforms promised to take a proactive role in removing false and
potentially harmful information related to the coronavirus.
Facebook was first. It announced it would warn users after they in-
teracted with posts containing “harmful” coronavirus misinformation5
and link those users to resources from the World Health Organization,
the Centers for Disease Control, and local health authorities to com-
bat the false information.6 Other platforms followed suit. YouTube re-
moved thousands of videos containing false information about the
coronavirus.7 Twitter began labeling false or misleading tweets about
the coronavirus.8
This moderation marked a departure from the laissez-faire ap-
proach social platforms have traditionally taken regarding false and
harmful content. The lack of regulation for social platforms has al-
lowed them to prefer models that prioritize the “free speech” of their
users despite longstanding cries for safer online spaces.9 With few ex-
3. Matthew Brown, Fact Check: 5G Technology Is Not Linked to Coronavirus,
USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2020, 2:52 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factch-
eck/2020/04/23/fact-check-5-g-technology-not-linked-coronavirus/3006152001/ [https://
perma.cc/BM4M-N8K9].
4. Nina I. Brown & Jonathan Peters, Say This, Not That: Government Regulation
and Control of Social Media, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 521, 525 (2018).
5. Shannon Bond, Did You Fall for a Coronavirus Hoax? Facebook Will Let You
Know, NPR (Apr. 16, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/16/835579533/did-
you-fall-for-a-coronavirus-hoax-facebook-will-let-you-know [https://perma.cc/9LAY-
T5YP]; Keeping People Informed, Safe, and Supported on Instagram, INSTAGRAM:
OFF. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2020), https://about.instagram.com/blog/announcements/
coronavirus-keeping-people-safe-informed-and-supported-on-instagram [https://
perma.cc/8QJB-R9R3].
6. Kang-Xing Jin, Keeping People Safe and Informed About the Coronavirus,
FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (June 24, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/05/
coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/J26M-KJD4].
7. Ina Fried, YouTube Pulls Coronavirus Misinformation Videos, AXIOS (Apr. 7,
2020), https://www.axios.com/youtube-coronavirus-misinformation-videos-google-
d9ce89cb-0de0-4f50-8a25-5923e078a858.html [https://perma.cc/P6A7-NB63].
8. Rebecca Heilweil, Twitter Now Labels Misleading Coronavirus Tweets with a
Misleading Label, VOX (May 11, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/
11/21254889/twitter-coronavirus-covid-misinformation-warnings-labels [https://
perma.cc/759M-N7DJ]; Yoel Roth & Nick Pickles, Updating Our Approach to Mis-
leading Information, TWITTER BLOG (May 11, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/
topics/product/2020/updating-our-approach-to-misleading-information.html [https://
perma.cc/PS3E-RQWF].
9. See Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American
Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 226 (2017) (quoting ZEYNEP TUFECKI,
TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST 267
(2017)); see also Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1618 (2018) (discussing how so-
cial platforms’ content-moderation policies have been influenced by the concerns
about user free speech and collateral censorship); Michael Holmes, ISIS Looking for
Recruits Online, WWLP (June 21, 2014, 12:29 AM), http://wwlp.com/2014/06/20/isis-
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ceptions, social platforms are under no legal obligation to police or
remove harmful content. 10 Additionally, a powerful federal law—sec-
tion 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)—immunizes
social platforms for harms resulting from user-generated content.11
This combination of immunity and lack of regulatory oversight is what
has enabled social platforms to function: their business model depends
on users freely creating and uploading content—driving advertising
revenue—with little risk of liability for the publisher of that content—
the platform.12
The practical result is that any content regulation that exists on so-
cial platforms is driven by the platform itself. Typically, this is driven
by the platform’s terms of use, which often prohibit posting and shar-
ing certain harmful material. However, because platforms are under
no legal obligation to remove posts that violate the terms, they are
free to enforce—or ignore—abuses of the terms at will. As a result,
this self-regulatory framework has allowed social platforms to develop
policies that prioritize profits over safety.13
These policies have had serious consequences. Facebook’s lenient
stance on hate speech has helped fuel the proliferation of white
supremacists and other extremist groups and actors, at times resulting
in tangible physical harm.14 YouTube’s and Twitter’s policies have al-
looking-for-recruits-online/ [http://perma.cc/2E4Y-25PB] (noting that Twitter founder
Biz Stone—who is no longer with the company—responded to media questions about
ISIS’s use of Twitter to publicize its acts of terrorism by saying, “[i]f you want to
create a platform that allows for the freedom of expression for hundreds of millions of
people around the world, you really have to take the good with the bad”); Somini
Sengupta, Twitter’s Free Speech Defender, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/technology/twitter-chief-lawyer-alexander-macgillivray-
defender-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/X39J-LZGJ]; Mike Isaac, Cecilia Kang &
Sheera Frenkel, Zuckerberg Defends Hands-Off Approach to Trump’s Posts, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/technology/zuckerberg-de-
fends-facebook-trump-posts.html [https://perma.cc/SJU2-VNEZ].
10. A notable exception is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which has a no-
tice and takedown provision that requires a service provider to remove infringing
material once the provider is on notice of its existence to merit safe harbor from
copyright infringement charges. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1)–(4).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
12. Casey Newton, Everything You Need to Know About Section 230: The Most
Important Law for Online Speech, THE VERGE (Dec. 29, 2020, 4:50 PM), https://
www.theverge.com/21273768/section-230-explained-internet-speech-law-definition-
guide-free-moderation [https://perma.cc/9SB9-N6ZH]; see also Michael Patty, Social
Media and Censorship: Rethinking State Action Once Again, 40 MITCHELL HAMLINE
L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. 99, 134 (2019).
13. Chloé Nurik, “Men Are Scum”: Self-Regulation, Hate Speech, and Gender-
Based Censorship on Facebook, 13 INT’L J. COMMC’N, 2878, 2880, 2887, 2889 (2019).
14. Daniela Hernandez & Parmy Olson, Isolation and Social Media Combine to
Radicalize Violent Offenders: Social Media Is Increasingly Playing a Role, Especially
Among Lone Actors Like the Ones Responsible for El Paso and Dayton Shootings,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/isolation-and-so-
cial-media-combine-to-radicalize-violent-offenders-11565041473 [https://perma.cc/
47YE-MKJ3]; Jenni Marsh & Tara Mulholland, How the Christchurch Terrorist Attack
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lowed terrorists to use their platforms to recruit, spread propaganda,
and raise funds.15 Revenge pornography has spread across Instagram,
Facebook, and Twitter.16 Social platforms were famously exploited by
disinformation campaigns during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election,
and commentators roundly agree that social platforms did not do
enough to reduce, let alone eliminate, disinformation in time for the
2020 presidential election.17
Despite the persistent public outcry for a more aggressive response
to harmful speech, social platforms have largely abdicated this respon-
sibility.18 This is not to suggest that they have ignored the problem:
each major platform has committed resources to reducing harmful
speech and has made progress.19 However, these shifts have largely
been reactive: social platforms have not embraced the concept of
proactively reducing abusive content.20 Only after the most egregious
abuses—and particularly following threatened legal action or loss of
advertisers—have social platforms responded by removing content,
making (often minor) policy changes, deleting user accounts, or
amending terms of service.21
Was Made for Social Media, CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/15/tech/christ-
church-internet-radicalization-intl/index.html (Mar. 16, 2019, 5:30 PM) [https://
perma.cc/F8Z5-CCKP].
15. Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 620 (6th Cir. 2019); Nina I. Brown, Fight
Terror, Not Twitter: Insulating Social Media from Material Support Claims, 37 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016).
16. See, e.g., GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 753 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) (dismissing claims involving revenge pornography
against GoDaddy under section 230); Caitlin Kelly, Facebook’s Anti-Revenge Porn
Tools Failed to Protect Katie Hill, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://
www.wired.com/story/katie-hill-revenge-porn-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/W9SY-
UCFV] (reporting that intimate photos of former U.S. Representative Katie Hill and
her former partner were disseminated across Facebook and Twitter); Olivia Solon,
Inside Facebook’s Efforts to Stop Revenge Porn Before It Spreads, NBC NEWS (Nov.
19, 2019, 10:15 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/inside-facebook-s-
efforts-stop-revenge-porn-it-spreads-n1083631 [https://perma.cc/GY35-JRT3] (report-
ing that revenge porn targeting twenty-two-year-old Michaela Zehara spread across
Instagram in 2016).
17. See Brian Beyersdorf, Regulating the “Most Accessible Marketplace of Ideas in
History”: Disclosure Requirements in Online Political Advertisements After the 2016
Election, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1082, 1098 (2019).
18. See Casey Newton, YouTube Expands Anti-Harassment Policy to Include All
Creators and Public Figures, THE VERGE (Dec. 11, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://
www.theverge.com/2019/12/11/21005185/youtube-harassment-policy-update-mali-
cious-expression-public-figures-maza-crowder [https://perma.cc/SE85-TNZK].
19. See id.; Salvador Rodriguez, Zuckerberg: Facebook Will Prohibit Hate Speech
in Its Ads, CNBC (June 26, 2020, 5:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/26/zuck-
erberg-facebook-will-prohibit-hate-speech-in-its-ads.html [https://perma.cc/723Y-
VAMK].
20. See Rodriguez, supra note 19.
21. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 18 (stating YouTube promised to “reconsider all
of its harassment policies” in response to public outcry for not removing homophobic
content); Rodriguez, supra note 19 (stating Facebook announced that it would ban
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In fact, the policy decisions that social platforms make are vague,
opaque, and often appear to do little more than pay lip service to their
ideals of corporate social responsibility. Simply put: they just do not
do enough. For example, although Facebook has repeatedly assured
its users that the platform does not tolerate online harassment, 22 an
independent audit recently found that Facebook has allowed hate
speech and disinformation to thrive. 23 Although Twitter emphasizes
what progress it has made in addressing these issues, it acknowledges
that online abuse remains a problem on its platform.24 Likewise, You-
Tube highlights its willingness to make policy adjustments as needed
to combat abuse, yet acknowledges that it has not done enough.25
Even the recent announcements about efforts to stop the spread of
false information concerning the coronavirus pandemic may turn out
to be little more than window dressing, given that a recent report
found “some of the most dangerous falsehoods had received hundreds
of thousands of views.” 26
One reason social platforms struggle is because content moderation
is difficult. Given the sheer number of new content posted in one min-
ute on any given platform, at least part of the content regulation must
be automated. Yet language is incredibly complicated, personal, and
context dependent, which limits the algorithms’ abilities to differenti-
ate between permissible and problematic posts.27 Another reason
platforms struggle is because they have been unwilling to draw clear
lines regarding what content violates their policies and consistently
and transparently enforcing them. 28
ads containing hate speech only after almost 100 advertisers began boycotting
Facebook for its failure to police hate speech).
22. Elizabeth Cohen, She Was Called the N-Word and Given Instructions to Slit
Her Wrists. What Did Facebook Do?, CNN HEALTH, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/01/
health/facebook-harassment-eprise/index.html (Nov. 1, 2019, 2:06 PM), [https://
perma.cc/W8CD-9B8U].
23. Mike Isaac, Facebook’s Decisions Were ‘Setbacks for Civil Rights,’ Audit
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/technology/
facebook-civil-rights-audit.html [https://perma.cc/8X46-WRRY].
24. Katy Minshall, #SaferInternetDay 2020: Creating a Better Internet for All,
TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 11, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/events/2020/
safer-internet-day-2020-creating-a-better-internet-for-all.html [https://perma.cc/5PK5-
3H44].
25. Julia Alexander, YouTube’s ‘Creator-on-Creator’ Harassment Policy Could
Affect Commentary Videos, THE VERGE (Aug. 5, 2019, 12:02 PM), https://
www.theverge.com/2019/8/5/20754620/youtube-commentary-harassment-creators-bul-
lying-susan-wojcicki [https://perma.cc/P9QW-X6Y7].
26. Joe Tidy, Coronavirus: Facebook Alters Virus Action After Damning Misinfor-
mation Report, BBC (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52309094
[https://perma.cc/4DMZ-KAXL].
27. Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns & Christian Katzenbach, Algorithmic Content
Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in the Automation of Platform Gov-
ernance, BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1, 5 (Feb. 28, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1177/
2053951719897945 [https://perma.cc/8M6L-HLPA].
28. Sarah Jeong, Turns Out Facebook Moderation Sucks Because Its Guidelines
Suck, THE VERGE (Apr. 24, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/24/
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Ultimately, social platforms engage in self-regulation privately and
selectively, and speech harms continue to thrive online. In response,
citizens and lawmakers have consistently called for the federal govern-
ment to regulate social media content on some level. The suggestion
has gained momentum, and while most social platforms have balked
at the idea,29 some have specifically sought it out.30
The thorn in any effort to regulate content on social platforms is, of
course, the First Amendment. With this in mind, a variety of different
options have been suggested to ameliorate harmful content without
running afoul of the Constitution. Several legislators and commenta-
tors have suggested significantly amending or altogether eliminating
the protections of section 230 of the CDA.31 Others have explored the
option of wholesale government regulation of social platforms as pub-
lic utilities.32
Regardless of the form content moderation takes, the growing cry
of citizens, lawmakers, and even some social platforms for federal
government oversight creates a likelihood of government intervention
within the next few years.33 The risk is that this momentum for change
will result in a rush to regulate without proper consideration of the
true costs and benefits.34 The enthusiasm across party lines for re-
17276794/facebook-moderation-guidelines-community-standards-nudity-hate-speech
[https://perma.cc/435F-7RMW]; Ahmad Sultan, We Need Real Transparency About
Hate on Social Media, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Jan. 2, 2019), https://
www.adl.org/blog/we-need-real-transparency-about-hate-on-social-media [https://
perma.cc/BP8H-69BX].
29. Natasha Tusikov & Blayne Haggart, It’s Time for a New Way to Regulate So-
cial Media Platforms, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 16, 2019, 6:48 PM), https://theconver-
sation.com/its-time-for-a-new-way-to-regulate-social-media-platforms-109413 [https://
perma.cc/L66G-NWDC].
30. See Andrew Hutchinson, Facebook Publishes New Whitepaper on Standard-
ized Online Content Regulation, SOC. MEDIA TODAY (Feb. 18, 2020), https://
www.socialmediatoday.com/news/facebook-publishes-new-whitepaper-on-standard-
ized-online-content-regulation/572416/ [https://perma.cc/23RE-5FJ4]; Mark Zuck-
erberg, Opinion, The Internet Needs New Rules. Let’s Start in These Four Areas.,
WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
mark-zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/
29/9e6f0504-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZU98-WCB2].
31. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017);
Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online
Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIA. L. REV. 137 (2008); David Lukmire, Can the Courts
Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. America
Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371 (2010); Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation
to Abuse: Does the Internet Still Need Section 230 Immunity?, 68 CATH. U. L. REV.
597 (2019).
32. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet
Platforms as the New Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234 (2018).
33. Ryan Tracy, Social Media’s Liability Shield Is Under Assault, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 26, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-medias-liability-shield-
is-under-assault-11606402800 [https://perma.cc/T2Z6-WESS].
34. See Steven Greenhut, The Bipartisan Push to Gut Section 230 Will Suppress
Online Speech, REASON.COM (Dec. 18, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://reason.com/2020/12/18/
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duced section 230 protections is particularly worrisome because the
issues of content regulation and section 230 reform are distinct policy
issues that all too often become ensnared in debate.
This Article acknowledges the need for some level of content regu-
lation for social platforms and explores three possible avenues for its
execution: private governance via platform self-regulation (the cur-
rent system), government regulation, and industry self-regulation.35
As this Article will demonstrate, an industry-wide governance model
is the optimal solution to reduce harmful speech on social media with-
out hindering the free exchange of ideas.
Part II outlines the current structure for permissible regulation with
a particular focus on section 230 of the CDA, since efforts to regulate
content online tend to center around this law. Part III addresses the
landscape of government regulation and endeavors to untangle the
conversation about section 230 from the debate about content regula-
tion. Part IV outlines systems of self-regulation, both at the platform
and industry levels. Part V concludes with a recommendation for a
system that addresses concerns of citizens and lawmakers who want to
reduce harms on social media while also balancing the interests of so-
cial platforms and robust speech rights.
II. THE LAY OF THE LAND: THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF
CONTENT REGULATION ON SOCIAL PLATFORMS
Strong First Amendment protections apply across all media, includ-
ing, of course, the Internet.36 In order to comply with the First
Amendment, wholesale regulation of mass communication has tradi-
tionally depended on a “medium-specific” approach by the courts.37
The broadcast media, for example, have customarily been subject to
the most government regulation and oversight.38 The Court has up-
held these regulations based on the invasive nature of the broadcast
the-bipartisan-push-to-gut-section-230-will-suppress-online-communication/ [https://
perma.cc/AY84-HF68].
35. This Article is necessarily limited to examining methods of regulation based on
the substance of communications and does not address a separate area under discus-
sion for more regulation: social platforms and data privacy.
36. Ashley Fuchs, Proceed with Caution: Why Curtailing Section 230 Immunity Is
Not the Solution to Social Media Regulation, UNIV. PENN.: CTR. ETHICS & RULE L.
(Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/10511-proceed-with-caution-
why-curtailing-section-230 [https://perma.cc/869D-CCEW].
37. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
38. Consider FCC regulations of indecent speech on the broadcast networks, 18
U.S.C. § 1464, or even the now-defunct Fairness Doctrine. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 370–71, 375 (1969) (upholding constitutionality of the fair-
ness doctrine); Maria Fontenot & Michael T. Martı́nez, FCC’s Indecency Regulation:
A Comparative Analysis of Broadcast and Online Media, 26 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 59,
72 (2019) (discussing differences between Internet and broadcast regulations);
Khaldoun Shobaki, Speech Restraints for Converged Media, 52 UCLA L. REV. 333,
343 (2004) (discussing differences in regulation of media forms).
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airwaves, their status as scarce expressive commodities, and the pub-
lic’s entitlement to receive suitable access to ideas.39 At the other end
of the spectrum, the print media is neither scarce nor invasive, and as
such, have a long history of robust protection under the First Amend-
ment.40 Thus, courts have consistently bristled at congressional at-
tempts to regulate print media.41
Like print media, the Internet is neither invasive nor scarce.42 When
it emerged as a new medium of mass communication, the Supreme
Court opted to treat it in the same vein as print media—with strong
First Amendment protection.43 The upshot is that online speech is
largely free from regulation based on the substance of the message
being communicated, regardless of the online platform or the content
creator’s identity.44
The broad protection for online speech means that few federal or
state guidelines exist that direct social platforms to police or remove
speech based on its content, leaving platforms in control over the vast
majority of content that resides on their networks.45 These platforms
have benefited enormously from this scheme and likely would not ex-
ist without it.46 Their business models rely on the ability of millions of
users to create and upload content without direction or oversight, and
advertisers who count on constant user engagement with that con-
tent.47 A regulatory framework permitting the government to prohibit
certain messaging would create a technological barrier to optimizing
this business model: platforms would need to have the means to filter,
separate, and potentially block content based upon the message com-
municated.48 As will be discussed further in Part IV, even the most
sophisticated algorithms struggle with content decisions, making a
39. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 387–90; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 731 n.2 (1978); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 185
(1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 637–39 (1994).
40. See Robert W. McChesney, Freedom of the Press for Whom? The Question To
Be Answered in Our Critical Juncture, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1433, 1444, 1446 (2007).
41. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
42. Reno, 521 U.S. at 869–70.
43. Id. at 863 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
44. Acknowledgement of broad First Amendment protection for Internet speech
has frustrated several attempts at government regulation of content, such as those
aimed at restricting sexually explicit material that could be harmful to minors. See,
e.g., id. at 844 (striking down anti-indecency provisions of the CDA); Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (upholding the injunction on enforcement of the
Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”)).
45. Kate Conger, Facebook, Google and Twitter C.E.O.s Return to Washington to




47. Tracy, supra note 33.
48. See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Legal Shield for Social Media Is Targeted by
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/busi-
ness/section-230-internet-speech.html [https://perma.cc/HR2U-S8NP].
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complete technological solution improbable. Given the sheer amount
of content posted, relying on human moderators to filter user posts
and fill this gap would create another massive burden.49
It is not the case, however, that there is no speech regulation online
or on social platforms. While most attempts at regulatory action have
not been successful,50 there exist discrete areas where regulation is
permissible. One example is a federal law that requires Internet sites
to remove images of child pornography.51 Another is the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), passed in 1998 to limit the liabil-
ity of internet service providers (“ISP”) for copyright infringement by
their users.52 The DMCA has a notice-and-takedown provision that,
to merit safe harbor from copyright infringement charges, requires
ISPs to remove infringing material once they are on notice of such
material’s existence.53
Importantly, platforms also benefit from a federal law that immu-
nizes them from liability for the content their users post.54 Arguably
the most important law for online speech, section 230 protects ISPs
from liability for content posted on their sites by third parties.55 This
law enables social platforms to function by allowing their users to
freely create and upload content with little risk of liability for the pub-
lisher of that content—the platform. It is also an increasingly contro-
versial law.
A. The Benefit of Section 230
The reason section 230 offers such robust protection from liability
for social platforms is because in crafting the law, Congress made the
policy decision to treat online publishers differently than print pub-
lishers.56 Essentially, Congress took the Court’s decision to treat the
internet like print media one step further and protected internet pub-
lishers more than their print counterparts.57 The law was written
49. Id.
50. See Nicholas P. Dickerson, Comment, What Makes the Internet So Special?
And Why, Where, How, and by Whom Should Its Content Be Regulated?, 46 HOUS. L.
REV. 61, 78 (2009) (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 673 (2004)). Attempts to re-
strict sexually explicit material that could be harmful to minors have been overwhelm-
ingly unsuccessful. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 673; Martha McCarthy, The
Continuing Saga of Internet Censorship: The Child Online Protection Act, 2005 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 83, 89 (2005).
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2252A.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1)–(4).
53. Amanda Reid, Considering Fair Use: DMCA’s Take Down & Repeat Infring-
ers Policies, 24 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 101, 102 (2019).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1), (f)(2). As Prof. Jeff Kossef has written, section 230 is
best understood as The Twenty-Six Words That Created the Internet. JEFF KOSSEFF,
THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
56. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–28 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Blumenthal
v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998)).
57. Id.
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before the emergence of social platforms and applies to immunize any
“provider or user of an interactive computer service” when that “pro-
vider or user” republishes content created by another user.58 The law
defines the term user broadly, and applies it “simply to anyone using
an interactive computer service.”59 The protection, too, is broad. Sec-
tion 230 shields providers from liability for their decisions to moderate
content, or to transmit content as is, without moderation.60
Thus, a range of interactive computer service providers—particu-
larly online services that rely on publishing third-party content, such
as social platforms—benefit from section 230.61 Section 230 has immu-
nized Facebook, Google (YouTube), Yahoo!, and others from liability
stemming from third-party content, even when the platform knew
about, tried to block, removed, or policed the content.62 Courts have
applied this immunity widely, encompassing claims for defamation,
negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, privacy, terror-
ism support, and more.63
In passing section 230, Congress elected to protect ISPs from inter-
mediary liability for the activity of their users in order to promote the
uninhibited flow of ideas throughout the internet without government
interference. However, this decision has also enabled harmful speech
to thrive online.64 As explained in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the
seminal case addressing the reach of section 230:
Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to
freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.
The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the commu-
nications of others represented, for Congress, simply another form
58. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
59. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 515 (Cal. 2006).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
61. Id.
62. See generally Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1118 (N.D. Cal.
2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355
(D.C. Cir. 2014); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1195–96 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc. (Barnes II), 570 F.3d 1096, 1102–03, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665
F. Supp. 2d 961, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
63. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003) (involving a
claim for defamation); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980,
983–84 (10th Cir. 2000) (involving a claim for defamation and negligence); Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (involving negligence claims);
Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525, 536 (D. Md. 2006)
(involving a claim under Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act); Doe v. Bates,
No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *2–3, *5–6 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)
(involving claims of negligence, negligence per se, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy, and distribution of child pornography);
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. Civ. 05–296–AA, 2005 WL 3005602, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 8,
2005) (involving a negligence claim resulting in personal injury).
64. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31. Congress’s decision in this light gives rise to a valid
argument that the Internet is the least-regulated form of media, even behind print.
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of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 was en-
acted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communica-
tion and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the
medium to a minimum. In specific statutory findings, Congress rec-
ognized the Internet and interactive computer services as offering
“a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportu-
nities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.” [47 U.S.C.] § 230(a)(3). It also found that the Internet and
interactive computer services “have flourished, to the benefit of all
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.” Id.
§ 230(a)(4). Congress further stated that it is “the policy of the
United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free mar-
ket that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive com-
puter services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” Id.
§ 230(b)(2).65
The goal of Congress’s decision in enacting section 230 was that In-
ternet companies would be encouraged to develop platforms that re-
lied almost entirely on user-generated content without fear of liability
for the content users posted. Without section 230, “the [potential] lia-
bility that would arise from allowing users to freely exchange informa-
tion with one another, at this [large] scale, would have been
astronomical” and could very well have prevented investors from sup-
porting social platforms.66
Considering the sheer volume of material that is posted to many
websites on any given day, policing all of the content would prove
impossible. As of October 2020, Facebook reported 2.74 billion active
users who log in to their accounts at least once a month.67 Each day,
users create a cumulative total of 4.3 billion posts and upload 8 billion
hours of video content.68 On Twitter, roughly 6,000 new tweets
emerge each second, totaling 350,000 tweets per minute, 500 million
per day, and 200 billion per year.69 On YouTube, 500 hours of content
65. Id.
66. David Post, Opinion, A Bit of Internet History, or How Two Members of Con-




67. Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reps. Third Quarter 2020 Results (Oct.
29, 2020) (available at https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_news/Facebook-Re-
ports-Third-Quarter-2020-Results-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PFZ-FRHD]); see also
Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reps. First Quarter 2020 Results (Apr. 29, 2020)
(available at https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_news/Facebook-Reports-First-
Quarter-2020-Results-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N7D-KXKT]).
68. Facebook Statistics and Facts, MARKET.US, https://market.us/statistics/social-
media/facebook/ [https://perma.cc/6E5K-YJ6W].
69. Twitter Usage Statistics, INTERNET LIVE STAT., https://www.internetlivestats.
com/twitter-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/77DD-T66V].
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are uploaded every minute.70 Given this volume, it is easy to under-
stand the value of section 230 for these platforms: intermediary liabil-
ity would cripple their business models.
But the benefits of section 230 extend beyond the liability shield for
large social platforms. As an initial matter, it applies to all users of
interactive services, which necessarily includes individuals,71 corpora-
tions,72 non-profit organizations,73 and more. It is easy to assume that
the greatest beneficiaries of the law are large social platforms—and
there may be some truth to that—but start-ups and small companies
also gain an advantage from this framework. Section 230 “deters frivo-
lous and costly lawsuits, and it speeds up resolution when such law-
suits are brought,”74 which enables small start-up companies to find a
foothold in the online space and “encourage[s] the next generation of
start-up businesses aspiring to disrupt the current Internet
incumbents.”75
Despite the businesses—large and small—that benefit from section
230, the ultimate beneficiaries are the users of interactive computer
services. Without section 230’s protections,  users would not find an
online space to quickly create and share thoughts, photos, and videos,
and view those posted by others.76 The ability to freely comment on
posts created by others would be stifled, as would the ability to
write—or read—product reviews.77 Further, these activities would still
be possible with significant content moderation that would lead to a
time lag between initial posting and ultimate online experience. This
lag would fundamentally change the way users utilize and rely on on-
line space.
Of course, immunity under section 230 is not unlimited. Users who
create harmful content expose themselves to liability for that content.
70. Mansoor Iqbal, YouTube Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020), BUS. APPS
(Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.businessofapps.com/data/youtube-statistics/ [https://
perma.cc/6S92-4SGL].
71. See, e.g., Mitan v. A. Neumann & Assocs., LLC, Civ. No. 08-6154, 2010 WL
4782771, at *17–18 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2010) (dismissing claim based on defamatory con-
tents in a forwarded email); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 528–29 (Cal. 2006)
(holding that CDA immunity extended to individuals who republished defamatory
statements via the internet originally made by others in email and internet postings).
72. See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020).
73. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Harvard Univ., 377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 69 (D.
Mass. 2019).




76. Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google is About
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This applies to social platforms, too—when any interactive computer
service develops content, or “contributes materially to the alleged ille-
gality of the conduct,” it is legally responsible for that content.78 In
other words, platforms can be held liable for any content they create
on their own or cause to exist.
There are five specific statutory exceptions to immunity, including
those sounding in (1) federal criminal law, (2) intellectual property
law, (3) state law, (4) communications privacy law, and (5) sex traf-
ficking law.79 The fifth exception is a recent addition.80 In 2018, Con-
gress enacted the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”),
clarifying that section 230 immunity will not offer protection for sev-
eral sex trafficking offenses, regardless of whether the service pro-
vider materially contributed to the unlawful conduct.81
B. Efforts to Remove the Shield of Section 230
Section 230’s breadth has made it an easy target for those hungry
for changes in the way social platforms curate—or do not curate—
their platforms. Commentators and legislators from across the politi-
cal spectrum have called for amending or otherwise reducing the pro-
tections afforded by section 230.82 These challenges can be
categorized into two basic groups: (1) those based on ideals of view-
point neutrality for platforms and (2) concerns that platforms do too
little to remove harmful content, such as cyber bullying,83 sexual har-
assment,84 cyberstalking,85 nonconsensual pornography,86 and
defamation.87
78. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (holding that Roommates.com was immune for claims arising from
the content that users provided but not from those arising from required questions it
asked users); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying
section 230 immunity where website “was responsible for the development of that
content—for the conversion of the legally protected records from confidential mate-
rial to publicly exposed information”).
79. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
80. Id.
81. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L.
No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018).
82. Nandita Bose & Raphael Satter, Should Facebook, Google be Liable for User




83. EMILY BAZELTON, STICKS AND STONES: DEFEATING THE CULTURE OF BULLY-
ING AND REDISCOVERING THE POWER OF CHARACTER AND EMPATHY (2013).
84. Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2012).
85. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 171–72
(Harvard Univ. Press 2014).
86. Id.
87. Lee K. Royster, Fake News: Potential Solutions to the Online Epidemic, 96
N.C. L. REV. 270, 275 (2017); Neville L. Johnson, Douglas L. Johnson, Paul Tweed &
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1. Calls to Leverage Immunity in Exchange for Viewpoint
Neutrality
Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have criticized section 230 and
have pushed for significant changes to it.88 However, conservatives
particularly favor calling for changes based on the ideals of viewpoint
neutrality for platforms.89 The essence of the argument is that social
platforms “censor opinions with which they disagree,” which is partic-
ularly problematic given that “these platforms function in many ways
as a 21st century equivalent of the public square.”90
Additionally, as private actors, the First Amendment does not con-
strain social platforms as it would against government actors.91 Courts
have held that private online service providers are not state actors for
First Amendment purposes,92 which means the First Amendment has
no direct role to play in regulating the content policies and practices
of social media companies.93 In spite of this, users have still sued so-
cial platforms on the basis of alleged conservative discrimination,94
and conservative lawmakers continue to argue that section 230 protec-
tions ought to be removed for platforms that demonstrate such an al-
leged bias.95
Rodney A. Smolla, Defamation and Invasion of Privacy in the Internet Age, 25 SW. J.
INT’L 9, 39 (2019).
88. Marguerite Reardon, What’s Section 230? The Social Media Law That’s Clog-




90. Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
91. See generally Brown & Peters, supra note 4, at 540.
92. See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (hold-
ing that the state action doctrine precluded constitutional scrutiny of private entity’s
content moderation); Wilson v. Twitter, No. 3:20-cv-00054, 2020 WL 4353686, at *5
(S.D.W.V. May 1, 2020) (“That private social media companies now host platforms
which imitate the functions of public forums—in many respects more effectively than
the traditional public forums of government-owned sidewalks, streets, and public
parks—does not mean that the entities are state-actors for the purposes of the First
Amendment.”); Tulsi Now, Inc. v. Google, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-06444-SVW-RAO, 2020
WL 4353686, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020); Fed. Agency of News LLC v.
Facebook, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1126–27 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
93. Brown & Peters, supra note 4, at 540.
94. See Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 3d 30, 41 (D.D.C. 2019)
(“[T]he Amended Complaint focuses on the Platforms’ alleged suppression of con-
servative political content. It details, for instance, the seemingly disparate treatment
of conservative news publishers on Facebook and of conservative commentators on
Twitter. But while selective censorship of the kind alleged by the Plaintiffs may be
antithetical to the American tradition of freedom of speech, it is not actionable under
the First Amendment unless perpetrated by a state actor.” (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
95. See, e.g., Cale Guthrie Weissman, Ted Cruz Made It Clear He Supports Repeal-
ing Tech Platforms’ Safe Harbor, FAST CO. (Oct. 17, 2018), https://
www.fastcompany.com/90252598/ted-cruz-made-it-clear-he-supports-repealing-tech-
platforms-safe-harbor [https://perma.cc/B3SY-LBAD].
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One recent attempt to translate this belief into action occurred in
May 2020, when President Trump issued an executive order purport-
ing to limit section 230’s protections.96 The move was easily inter-
preted as retaliatory: it came days after Twitter decided to add a fact-
check label to two of the President’s arguably false tweets about mail-
in voting. The executive order tasked the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) with redefining when section 230 applies and
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) with ensuring that social plat-
forms adhere to their own terms and conditions.97 Under the order,
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) would also review a list of plat-
forms and determine whether they impose “viewpoint-based speech
restrictions” and are therefore “problematic vehicles for government
speech.”98 If so, the DOJ would restrict or curtail government ad-
spending on those platforms.99
The FCC and the DOJ have already taken action. In June 2020, the
DOJ submitted its recommendations for amending section 230 pursu-
ant to Trump’s executive order. The proposal identified four areas
that were ripe for reform, including amending section 230 to incen-
tivize platforms to reduce illegal content on their sites, clarifying the
federal government’s ability to enforce claims on behalf of citizens,
increasing competition among the social platforms, and increasing dis-
closure and transparency in content moderation processes.100 In Octo-
ber 2020, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai announced that the agency would
“move forward with a rulemaking to clarify [section 230’s]
meaning.”101
However, the executive order is constitutionally problematic be-
cause it is an effort to both force and limit the speech of social plat-
forms. The First Amendment protects both of these activities, as
platforms have the freedom to determine what content appears on
their sites or refrain from speaking at all. Thus, requiring a social plat-
form to host content that it would otherwise prohibit or limit is a clear
violation of its First Amendment rights.102 The executive order suffers
from other legal deficiencies, most notably that it is not legally suffi-
cient to amend an existing statute, particularly one with a twenty-five-
year history of judicial interpretations inconsistent with the order’s




100. Section 230 – Nurturing Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability?, U.S. DEP’T
JUST. 1, 7 (June 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1286331/download [https://
perma.cc/UWT8-68VP].
101. Statement of Chairman Pai on Section 230, FCC (October 2020), https://
docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-367567A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N9D-T4RR].
102. Brown & Peters, supra note 4.
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terms.103 But the fact that the order has little support in the law was
probably beside the point, because the ultimate goal was instead to
intimidate those that might limit what Mr. Trump says, even when it is
blatantly false or harmful. It was to send a message to social plat-
forms: any effort to limit or frame the president’s speech, even when
false and potentially damaging, will be met with aggressive legal
action.
Other lawmakers have also tried to limit section 230’s sweeping
protections for social platforms on the basis that platforms make overt
efforts to censor conservative speech.104 Senator Ted Cruz has been a
vocal opponent of section 230, arguing that platforms should be con-
tent-neutral, and has asked the administration to modify proposed
trade deals to remove language that offers immunity from liability
similar to section 230.105 During congressional hearings in August
2020, Representatives Jim Sensenbrenner and Jim Steube accused
Facebook of filtering out conservative speech on its platform.106
Senator Josh Hawley has introduced at least three bills since 2019 to
amend section 230 to remove immunity unless tech companies prove
their algorithms and content-removal practices are politically neu-
tral.107 One of Senator Hawley’s proposals, the Ending Support for
Internet Censorship Act, is part of a class of proposed legislation that
aims to tackle perceived censorship of conservative speech online.108
103. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“[T]he
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he
is to be a lawmaker.”).
104. There is partisan support for this belief. How Can Social Media Firms Tackle
Hate Speech?, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON (Sep. 22, 2018), https://knowl-
edge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/can-social-media-firms-tackle-hate-speech/ [https://
perma.cc/5JGT-KDES] (noting that a Pew Research poll from June 2018 found that
“many Americans perceive social media as playing an active role in censorship. When
asked whether they think it likely that social platforms actively censor political views
that those companies find objectionable, 72% of respondents . . . said yes. Republi-
cans were especially inclined to think so: 85% of Republicans and Republican-leaning
independents said it was likely that social media sites intentionally censor political
viewpoints, with 54% saying it was very likely, found the Pew survey of 4,594 U.S.
adults.”).
105. Letter from Ted Cruz, Texas Senator, to Robert Lighthizer, United States
Trade Representative (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/
2019.11.01_USTR%20Sec%20230%20LTR.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V8Q-NFPR]; Elliot
Harmon, No, Section 230 Does Not Require Platforms to Be “Neutral”, EFF (April 12,
2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/no-section-230-does-not-require-plat-
forms-be-neutral [https://perma.cc/E344-JSU5]; Weissman, supra note 95.
106. Online Platforms and Market Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Ju-
diciary, 116th Cong. (2020).
107. See, e.g., Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immu-
nity for Big Tech Companies, JOSH HAWLEY U.S. SENATOR FOR MO. (June 19, 2019),
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-
230-immunity-big-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/U9UM-NBR8].
108. Zoe Bedell & John Major, What’s Next for Section 230? A Roundup of Pro-
posals, LAWFARE: SOC. MEDIA (July 29, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/whats-next-section-230-roundup-proposals [https://perma.cc/BZ8Y-6G75].
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Hawley’s proposal focuses on revoking immunity for social platforms
that are unable to demonstrate their content moderation practices are
politically neutral.109 If passed, the Ending Support for Internet Cen-
sorship Act would force tech giants to apply for immunity through the
FTC every two years.110 An applicant would have to prove that it em-
ploys politically neutral content moderation practices by clear and
convincing evidence, and the FTC would then take a vote to grant
immunity if approved by a supermajority.111
Senators Hawley and  Marco Rubio have also proposed the Limit-
ing Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act.112 This proposal
would make a social network’s immunity under section 230 contingent
upon the network’s contractual commitment to using “good faith”
practices when making content moderation decisions.113 This good
faith requirement would bar tech companies from enforcing their
terms unevenly based on perceived political bias.114
Finally, Senator Hawley also introduced the BAD ADS Act, which,
unlike his other proposals, does not attempt to impose political neu-
trality on tech companies and their content moderation processes.115
Instead, this proposal aims to prevent social networks from using be-
havioral advertising practices on their platforms.116 To achieve this ob-
jective, the proposal revokes section 230 immunity for thirty days
whenever a social network uses behavioral advertising practices on its
site.117 Such practices consist of collecting user data to create advertis-
ing profiles based on a user’s personal demographics and online activ-
ity then using that data to generate user-specific advertisements.118
109. Id.
110. Mary Catherine Wellons, GOP Senator Introduces a Bill That Would Blow Up
Business Models for Facebook, YouTube and Other Tech Giants, CNBC: TECH (Jun.
19, 2019, 8:27 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/18/sen-hawley-bill-would-revoke-
cda-section-230-for-large-tech-companies.html [https://perma.cc/L78Y-LUCT].
111. Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big
Tech Companies, JOSHUA HAWLEY U.S. SENATOR FOR MO. (Jun. 19, 2019), https://
www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-im-
munity-big-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/8P8R-2P8Y].
112. Lauren Feiner, GOP Sen. Hawley Unveils His Latest Attack on Tech’s Liability




114. Press Release, Marco Rubio, U.S. Sen. for Fla., Rubio, Hawley Announce Bill
Empowering Americans to Hold Big Tech Companies Accountable for Acting in Bad
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The Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity Act (“OFVDA”) is
conservative lawmakers’ most recent attempt to condition section 230
immunity upon politically neutral content moderation practices.119 In
order to accomplish this, the OFVDA would remove the catchall lan-
guage in section 230(c)(2)(A) that currently affords social platforms
civil immunity when they remove user content that is “otherwise ob-
jectionable.”120 In addition, the OFVDA would amend section
230(c)(2)(A) to specifically grant immunity when platforms censor
content that is “unlawful,” “promotes terrorism,” or “promotes self-
harm.”121
In practice, these modifications would force platforms to surrender
their independent discretion in exchange for immunity. Thus, platform
immunity would only cover the removal of posts that fall within the
narrowly specified categories of harm, enumerated in section
230(c)(2)(A).122 To obtain this immunity, platforms would have to
demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that the content re-
moved falls within one of those categories.123 The OFVDA was intro-
duced on September 8, 2020, and is currently before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.124
In 2019, Representative Louie Gohmert introduced the Biased Al-
gorithm Deterrence Act to remove section 230 protection for plat-
forms that “hinder” the display of user-generated content.125 In the
same year, Representative Paul Gosar proposed the Stop the Censor-
ship Act to combat a perceived conservative bias in content modera-
tion practices.126 Under Senator Gosar’s proposal, in order to retain
section 230 immunity, social networks could only remove illegal con-
tent from their platforms. As a result, any platform whose content
moderation practices involve removing legal, yet objectionable mate-
rial, would lose its immunity.127 Many of these efforts to amend sec-
119. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., Wicker, Graham,
Blackburn Introduce Bill to Modify Section 230 and Empower Consumers Online




121. Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity Act, S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020).
122. U.S. Senate Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., supra note 119.
123. See id.
124. S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020).
125. Biased Algorithm Deterrence Act of 2019, H.R. 492, 116th Cong. (2019).
126. Stop the Censorship Act, H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019); Press Release, Paul
Gosar, D.D.S., Representing Ariz.’s 4th Dist., Gosar Introduces Stop the Censorship
Act of 2020 (July 29, 2020), https://gosar.house.gov/news/documentsin-
gle.aspx?DocumentID=3968#:~:text=Gooden.,and%20complements%20President
%20Donald%20J [https://perma.cc/E6AM-47CB].
127. H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019).
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tion 230 are based on the false belief that section 230 somehow
requires platform neutrality, which it plainly does not.128
2. Calls to Leverage Immunity in Exchange for Social
Responsibility
Criticisms of section 230 are not limited to conservatives, though
the arguments for revision of the law among liberals typically find
their grounding in beliefs that the law provides too much immunity for
social platforms that do too little to regulate harmful speech.129 A
chief concern for democratic lawmakers is the rampant disinformation
that spread on social platforms amidst the 2016 presidential election,
and that seemingly little has been done to address it since that time.130
It is true that the spread of false information on social platforms is
unique compared to other forms of media. Unlike traditional news
media that depend on fact-checking and verification processes, social
platforms are built for instant content sharing, without verification.131
Indeed, their business models rely on a lack of gatekeepers,132 and
“[t]he information-sharing environment is well suited to the spread of
falsehoods.”133 President Joe Biden has been an outspoken critic of
section 230 for this reason, arguing that immunity should be revoked
for social platforms in light of the fact that Facebook and other large
social platforms knowingly allowed falsehoods to propagate online in
128. See 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Cox), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/1995/8/4/house-section/article/
h8460-1 [https://perma.cc/QEX9-6TKT]; see also Emily Stewart, Ron Wyden Wrote
the Law That Built the Internet. He Still Stands by It—And Everything It’s Brought
with It., VOX (May 16, 2019, 9:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/16/
18626779/ron-wyden-section-230-facebook-regulations-neutrality [https://perma.cc/
8K8M-UAA9] (quoting Senator Ron Wyden, author of section 230, as saying “Section
230 is not about neutrality. Period. Full stop.”); Weissman, supra note 95; Harmon,
supra note 105. R
129. Marguerite Reardon, What’s Section 230? The Social Media Law That’s Clog-
ging up the Stimulus Talks, CNET (Dec. 30, 2020, 8:16 AM), https://www.cnet.com/
news/whats-section-230-the-social-media-law-thats-clogging-up-the-stimulus-talks/
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/EJ3N-DE5Q].
130. See Andrew Hutchinson, Despite Everything, Facebook Remains a Prominent
Facilitator of Election Misinformation, SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2020), https://
www.socialmediatoday.com/news/despite-everything-facebook-remains-a-prominent-
facilitator-of-election-mi/589255/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/GB9J-HRBX].
131. JOE GREEK, SOCIAL NETWORK-POWERED INFORMATION SHARING 36 (2014).
132. Nina I. Brown, Deepfakes and the Weaponization of Disinformation, 23 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 19–20 (2020); Marguerite Rigoglioso, Online Social Networks Can
Increase Ad Revenue by Stimulating Content, STAN. BUS. (Nov. 1, 2011), https://
www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/online-social-networks-can-increase-ad-revenue-stimu-
lating-content [https://perma.cc/DP2R-ZMV3] (explaining that social platforms have
a financial incentive to encourage their users to post as much content as possible).
133. Robert Chesney & Danielle K. Citron, Disinformation on Steroids: The Threat
of Deep Fakes, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/re-
port/deep-fake-disinformation-steroids [https://perma.cc/V4AS-J53D].
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the form of false political advertising.134 President Biden’s end game is
focused on more content moderation geared toward reducing misin-
formation, in contrast to Mr. Trump’s apparent position that content
should be left entirely unmoderated.135 Other democrats have voiced
similar concerns.136 House Speaker Nancy Pelosi threatened in 2019
that section 230 could be “in jeopardy” based on an argument that
social platforms have not been “treating it with the respect that they
should.”137 Senators Chris Coons and Mark Warner have also warned
of imposing regulation on social platforms unless they meaningfully
address issues concerning the spread of misinformation that threatens
the democratic process.138 The role of social platforms in spreading
such misinformation and its impact on the 2016 presidential election is
well-documented.139
Harms beyond falsehoods also spread on social platforms and in-
clude defamation, revenge pornography, hate speech,  harassment di-
rected towards marginalized groups, and more.140 Scores of
commentators and legislators have argued that the proliferation of
this problematic speech is the result of section 230, and have called for
its amendment or outright revocation.141 Vice President Kamala Har-
134. Makena Kelly, Joe Biden Doesn’t Like Trump’s Twitter Order, but Still Wants
to Revoke Section 230, THE VERGE (May 29, 2020, 1:50 PM), https://
www.theverge.com/2020/5/29/21274812/joe-biden-donald-trump-twitter-facebook-sec-
tion-230-moderation-revoke [https://perma.cc/8MZY-DZLY]; Cristiano Lima, Biden:
Tech’s Liability Shield ‘Should Be Revoked’ Immediately, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2020,
10:56 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/17/joe-biden-tech-liability-shield-
revoked-facebook-100443 [https://perma.cc/P9KW-39X9].
135. Lima, supra note 134.
136. Todd Shields & Ben Brody, Washington’s Knives are Out for Big Tech’s Social
Media Shield, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-08-11/section-230-is-hated-by-both-democrats-and-republicans-for-
different-reasons [https://perma.cc/BA2A-H3H4].
137. Taylor Hatmaker, Nancy Pelosi Warns Tech Companies That Section 230 Is ‘In
Jeopardy’, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2019, 2:35 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/12/
nancy-pelosi-section-230/ [https://perma.cc/98V2-73H6].
138. Bloomberg, Senators Threaten to Regulate Facebook Unless It Makes Fixes,
FORTUNE (Nov. 17, 2018, 7:24 AM), https://fortune.com/2018/11/17/facebook-regula-
tion-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/BY2Y-5F64]; Mark R. Warner, Potential Policy Pro-
posals for Regulation of Social Media and Technology Firms, SENATE.GOV (July 30,
2018), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/7/read-the-warner-social-
media-white-paper [https://perma.cc/CSH2-DW6X].
139. Hasen, supra note 9, at 205–07; Morgan Chalfant, Researchers Say Fake News
Had ‘Substantial Impact’ on 2016 Election, THE HILL (Apr. 3, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://
thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/381449-researchers-say-fake-news-had-substantial-
impact-on-2016-election [https://perma.cc/MRU2-U29C]; Alexis C. Madrigal, What
Facebook Did to American Democracy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebook-did/542502/ [https://
perma.cc/HPS3-79KR].
140. Paul M. Barrett, Opinion, Why the Most Controversial US Internet Law Is
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ris, for example, has made efforts to revise or repeal section 230 for
years, since she was the attorney general for California, based prima-
rily upon concerns about the use of online spaces by child sex traffick-
ers.142 Professors Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes argue that
section 230 immunity is too sweeping given that it protects platforms
that knowingly create avenues for sexual predators to connect with
victims.143 Professor Citron has suggested a balanced approach that
would recognize cyber rights while allowing for protections of section
230,144 and Professor Vanessa Browne-Barbour argues that courts
should adopt a narrower interpretation of section 230 to provide a
defamation remedy.145 Some commentators have recommended that
section 230 be amended to more closely resemble the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act’s notice-and-takedown policy by making civil im-
munity contingent upon the site taking down offensive content once
brought to its attention.146 Others have suggested that section 230 be
amended to specifically exclude social platforms from civil immunity
based on the rationale that they are not merely passive service provid-
ers, but instead play a role in selecting what information is spread on
their platforms.147
A bipartisan group of legislators led by Senator Lindsey Graham
introduced the EARN IT Act of 2020 (“EARN IT”), which is an ef-
fort to hold social platforms accountable for the child exploitation that
exists on their platforms.148 This act would operate similarly to
FOSTA by denying social networks immunity for causes of action
arising from user content that sexually exploits minors.149 EARN IT
would also create a panel to advise social platforms on best practices
to curb child exploitation on their sites.150 EARN IT’s critics have ex-
pressed concern that the proposed legislation is actually a subtle at-
tack on encryption.151 This is because social networks may be
incentivized to ban encryption to better monitor all content on their
142. Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet’s First Amendment. Now




143. Citron & Wittes, supra note 31.
144. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 117 (2009).
145. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel: Revisiting § 230
Immunity, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1505 (2015).
146. Andrew P. Bolson, Flawed but Fixable: Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act at 20, 42 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 14–15 (2016).
147. Nicole Phe, Social Media Terror: Reevaluating Intermediary Liability Under
the Communications Decency Act, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 99, 127 (2018).
148. Bedell & Major, supra note 108.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Lily Hay Newman, The EARN IT Act is a Sneak Attack on Encryption, WIRED
(Mar. 5, 2020, 8:22 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/earn-it-act-sneak-attack-on-en-
cryption/ [https://perma.cc/92Q7-EYF9].
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platforms and thereby avoid liability.152 Nevertheless, the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee approved EARN IT.153 One June 24, 2020, Senator
Brian Schatz introduced another effort, the Platform Accountability
and Consumer Transparency Act.154 It has since been referred to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.155 The propo-
sal is intended to reduce illegal content on social media networks and
simultaneously promote consistency and transparency within content
moderation practices.156
The point is simply this: there are as many ideas to redefine, limit,
or otherwise amend section 230 as there are speakers on the sub-
ject.157 This Article is neither an attempt to unpack those ideas nor
compile an exhaustive list of them. Instead, it is an attempt to recog-
nize that section 230 has had myriad critics as well as supporters, dis-
cussed in Part III.B, complicating efforts to achieve consensus on
what, if any, reform should look like.
3. The Nexus Between Content Regulation and Section 230
Reform
Lawmakers and scholars are calling for revision of section 230 to
achieve changes to the type of content social media companies allow
on their platforms.158 On one hand, this makes perfect sense because
enacting a new law to restrict certain content on social platforms
would suffer from certain constitutional challenges.159 Section 230, on
the other hand, is a congressional grant that offers valuable immunity
for platforms.160 Predicating section 230 protection upon moderation
of content in a certain manner allows for a framework for regulating
content while avoiding constitutional problems.
152. Id.
153. Makena Kelly, A Weakened Version of the EARN IT Act Advances Out of
Committee, THE VERGE (July 2, 2020, 12:44 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/2/
21311464/earn-it-act-section-230-child-abuse-imagery-facebook-youtube-lindsey-gra-
ham [https://perma.cc/FBV9-DDVH].
154. S. 4066, 116th Cong. (2020).
155. Id.
156. Schatz, Thune Introduce New Legislation to Update Section 230, Strengthen
Rules, Transparency on Online Content Moderation, Hold Internet Companies Ac-





157. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1613–14 (collecting a thorough list of legal schol-
ars’ positions).
158. See supra Part II.B (discussing how numerous legislators and commentators
suggested amending section 230 to limit platform immunity).
159. See supra Part II.B (discussing how numerous legislators and commentators
suggested amending section 230 to limit platform immunity).
160. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 427, 433–34 (2009).
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A threshold problem is that efforts to reform section 230 to induce
particular content moderation practices will necessarily make distinc-
tions about speech on the basis of its content. For example, if revisions
to section 230 are predicated on reducing false information, the gov-
ernment is making what would otherwise be an impermissible speech
distinction: false speech is often protected by the First Amendment.161
Furthermore, who would determine whether the platform made the
correct decision regarding what constituted false information? Would
this role fall to someone at a government agency like the FTC,162 a
judge in an action where the social platform has pled a section 230
defense and the plaintiff claims the defendant waived immunity for
failure to comply with the law, or another government representative?
None of these options are ideal because the question of falsity is left
either to a government official—exceptionally troubling from a First
Amendment perspective—or creates the expense of litigating the
truth or falsity of a statement on a motion to dismiss.163 This same
dilemma would be true for other types of problematic speech identi-
fied by lawmakers and commentators as reasons to revisit section 230
immunity.
This is particularly problematic given the importance social plat-
forms have in public discussion and debate. Posts on controversial top-
ics or those with alternative viewpoints would be especially vulnerable
to removal, which has the practical effect of deputizing online compa-
nies to censor speech that the government would never be allowed to
touch because of the First Amendment.164 The result, in short, is de
facto government regulation of online speech. This is the chief reason
why amending section 230 to force platforms into better accountabil-
ity is so problematic: the government is able to make an end run
around the First Amendment’s restrictions on creating content-based
regulations.
Another problem with this type of reform is that it is built on the
faulty assumption that conditioning platform immunity on content
moderation will achieve a net reduction of online speech harms. In all
likelihood, speech harms will continue to exist even in a world without
section 230 protection. Removing this immunity (or threatening to re-
move it by making its protections contingent upon satisfaction of cer-
tain requirements) may indeed create incentives for platforms to
161. Brown & Peters, supra note 4, at 533.
162. The May 28, 2020 executive order on Preventing Online Censorship purports
to designate the FTC as the decisionmaker of whether complaints allege violations of
law that implicate the policies set forth by the order. Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed.
Reg. 34,079, 34,082 (May 28, 2020).
163. Cass. R. Sustein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
387, 398–400 (2020), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/articlePDFs/v33/
33HarvJLTech387.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/W896-BCAT].
164. Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353,
1364–66 (2018).
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minimize speech harms, but this will come at a steep cost: over-re-
moval of speech.165 The bottom line is that penalizing platforms by
removing section 230 protection does not induce platforms to create a
safer space—it induces them to minimize risk.
Faced with the practical impossibility of removing all harmful
speech, platforms would have to draw lines to remove user speech
that is likely to lead to liability for the platform, while leaving in place
speech that will not. Current content moderation practices favor auto-
mated decision making and rely less on human interpretation.166 This
creates challenges in differentiating between speech that creates a po-
tential legal liability, and that speech which would be protected. In-
deed, “[a] key concern in the deployment of automated moderation
technologies in the context of copyright is systematic overblock-
ing.”167 The reason is simple: many moderation decisions require
nuanced legal analysis; such as determining whether a negative state-
ment about someone rose to the level of actionable defamation, or
whether posted information about a sexual assault could be a disclo-
sure of another’s private fact, or whether a deepfake was legally prob-
lematic or a protected parody, and so on.168 As more platforms move
from human to algorithmic moderation,169 they are less likely to get
these tough context-based decisions—such as differentiating between
a woman breastfeeding and posing for a topless photo—correct,170
and at the same time would be faced with an increased risk of liability
for getting those decisions wrong. “The clearest problem is that lan-
guage is incredibly complicated, personal and context dependent:
even words that are widely accepted to be slurs may be used by mem-
bers of a group to reclaim certain terms.”171 This is why “[c]ontent
moderation at scale is impossible to perform perfectly—platforms
have to make millions of decisions a day and cannot get it right in
every instance. Because error is inevitable, content moderation system
165. Jeff Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary Liability, 15 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 123, 151–52 (2010).
166. Klonick, supra note 9, at 1636.
167. Gorwa, Binns & Katzenbach, supra note 27, at 7–8.
168. Id.
169. See Sarah T. Roberts, The Great A.I. Beta Test, SLATE (Apr. 8, 2020, 12:53
PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/04/coronavirus-facebook-content-moderation-
automated.html [https://perma.cc/V89M-C9RZ] (describing how policy exemptions
will not be understood by algorithms, such as when “material that would look, to a
machine, like excessive blood and gore but, in fact, was the video of an unlawful
attack on civilians in a conflict zone”).
170. See id. (noting that “[d]espite their technological sophistication, such auto-
mated tools fall far short of a human’s discernment”); Gorwa, Binns & Katzenbach,
supra note 27, at 8 (describing that “[w]hile Content ID and other systems may im-
prove from a technical standpoint, enhancing their ability to create quality finger-
prints and then accurately detect those fingerprints, it does not necessarily mean that
they become more adept at evaluating actual copyright infringement” (emphasis in
original)).
171. Gorwa, Binns & Katzenbach, supra note 27, at 10.
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design requires choosing which kinds of errors the system will err on
the side of making.”172 With a threat of liability looming—in spades,
because removing section 230 opens the floodgates to plaintiffs hun-
gry for a deep-pocketed defendant—this framework incentivizes plat-
forms to remove all speech that could be interpreted near that line.173
This increased legal pressure on social platforms almost certainly
would result in “overly aggressive, unaccountable self-policing, lead-
ing to arbitrary and unnecessary restrictions on online behavior.”174
Indeed, platforms have acknowledged that over-censorship will oc-
cur because the automated moderation systems will find more “‘false
positives,’ meaning that content will be removed that should remain
up.”175 The history of platforms’ compliance with the DMCA by over-
removal illustrates this point—the threat of secondary liability induces
service providers to comply with the notice-and-takedown provisions,
even when the notice is questionable or flawed.176 There are also sig-
nificant abuses of the takedown provision of the DMCA designed to
silence speech. As Wendy Seltzer notes, the promise of rapid take-
down compounds the problem and
creates an incentive for copyright claimants to file dubious take-
down claims. The mechanism is cheap for the claimant, more expen-
sive for the respondent, and if the process stops after the claim stage
(as it often does) the complained-of material remains offline. And
unless the complaint is so groundless that it can give rise to a lawsuit
against the complainant, a non-infringing poster has no legal or
practical recourse against bogus claims.177
None of this is to say that the goals of reducing or removing harmful
speech online are not important—indeed they are. And it may well be
true that the only means to achieve an Internet with fewer speech
harms is through an imperfect system of content moderation. But
overregulation at the request of—or inducement by—the government
is inherently more problematic than a platform’s own decision to
over-remove content. Any approach to amend section 230 to achieve
172. Evelyn Douek, COVID-19 and Social Media Content Moderation, LAWFARE
(Mar. 25, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/covid-19-and-social-media-
content-moderation [https://perma.cc/T93W-2UC2].
173. Kosseff, supra  note 165. Even where the legal framework requires “good
faith” efforts to remove harmful content, the platform is still incentivized to over-
remove potentially objectionable content so that there is little argument that it did not
act in consistent good faith. Id. at 131–32.
174. Milton L. Mueller, Comment, Hyper-Transparency and Social Control: Social
Media as Magnets for Regulation, 39 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 804, 809 (2015); Roberts,
supra note 169 (“The overly broad bluntness of these tools is less of a mistake and
more of an infringement on the right to create, access, and circulate information.”).
175. Douek, supra note 172.
176. Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling
Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 177
(2010).
177. Id. at 178.
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content regulation goals would likely induce the removal of too much
speech—instead of encouraging platforms to remove as much bad
speech as possible—while recognizing that getting it right all of the
time is impractical.
III. FINDING THE BEST WAY FORWARD
While achieving government-driven content regulation through sec-
tion 230 reform is problematic, reducing speech harms on social plat-
forms is an important goal, and one that social media companies
should be encouraged to devote their resources toward. The challenge
is providing the appropriate incentives to social platforms that will
hold them accountable while considering countervailing First Amend-
ment interests.
A key concern related to any content regulation goal or require-
ment for social platforms is an understanding of what is technologi-
cally possible and how social media companies are using that
technology in their current content moderation practices. This is a
critically important and ever-evolving area that, while generally be-
yond the scope of this Article, warrants a brief discussion.
A. Methods of Content Moderation
The major social networks have taken a mixed approach to content
moderation, using both algorithms and humans to remove harmful
content from their platforms. Sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube use algorithms to detect content suspected of violating their
community standards.178 Algorithms then flag the questionable posts
and refer them to human content moderators for evaluation.179
Algorithms are an important tool in moderating social platforms,
but they have limitations. This is particularly true when it comes to
identifying whether speech expressing social or political views is per-
missible. This limitation has meant that algorithms have struggled to
accurately identify—and remove—hate speech.180 Algorithms have





179. Sissi Cao, Facebook’s AI Chief Explains How Algorithms Are Policing Con-
tent—And Whether It Works, OBSERVER (Dec. 6, 2019, 7:15 AM), https://ob-
server.com/2019/12/facebook-artificial-intelligence-chief-explain-content-moderation-
policy-limitation/ [https://perma.cc/6GGC-7XDH]; How Automated Tools Are Used
in the Content Moderation Process, supra note 178.
180. See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Hannes Grassegger, Facebook’s Secret Censorship
Rules Protect White Men from Hate Speech, but Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA
(June 28, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-
ensorship-internal-documents-algorithms [https://perma.cc/S5KG-C54B] (noting that
Facebook algorithms classified a post calling for the killing of all “radicalized” Mus-
lims as protected political opinion, rather than removing it as a form of hate speech).
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also repeatedly failed to intercept violent content before it appears on
platforms.181 Numerous abusive posts slide through the algorithmic
cracks on a daily basis, leaving users on social platforms to report dis-
turbing content after it has already circulated.182 For example,
Facebook’s algorithms infamously allowed a live video of the Christ-
church massacre to stream across the platform in 2019.183 When
Facebook finally terminated the livestream—in response to numerous
user complaints—it had already run for seventeen minutes.184
Just as algorithms fail to detect offensive posts, they frequently cen-
sor appropriate content. For instance, after a community newspaper in
Texas posted excerpts from the Declaration of Independence,
Facebook’s hate speech algorithm flagged and automatically removed
the post for violating the platform’s hate speech standards.185 The rea-
son was likely a line in the document about “merciless Indian
savages,” though Facebook declined to confirm that was the case.186
The same is true when it comes to images of nudity. Although algo-
rithms have been relatively successful at identifying nudity, they have
proven incapable of discerning the harmless from the harmful. In ad-
dition to removing child pornography, algorithms have erroneously
removed images of classic art and women breastfeeding.187
These errors establish a major shortcoming of algorithmic content
moderation: its inability to understand context. While algorithms may
be useful tools for flagging purposes, they are not a substitute for
human content moderators. Unlike human content moderators, algo-
181. See James Vincent, AI Won’t Relieve the Misery of Facebook’s Human Moder-
ators, THE VERGE (Feb. 27, 2019, 12:41 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/27/
18242724/facebook-moderation-ai-artificial-intelligence-platforms [https://perma.cc/
HN5C-3LBE].
182. Kalev Leetaru, Facebook’s Failed AI Showcases the Dangers of Technologists




184. Donie O’Sullivan, Facebook Says It’s Policing Its Platform, but It Didn’t Catch
a Livestream of a Massacre. Why?, CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/15/tech/
facebook-new-zealand-content-moderation/index.html (Mar. 15, 2019, 2:21 PM)
[https://perma.cc/V8Q8-3HZZ].
185. Sam Wolfson, Facebook Labels Declaration of Independence As ‘Hate Speech’,




187. Stephanie Linning, ‘It Is The Most Beautiful and Natural Thing’: Facebook
Sparks User Backlash When It Removes Photo of Topless Mother Breastfeeding Her
Baby, MAIL ONLINE (Jun. 29, 2017, 1:55 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/arti-
cle-4650418/Facebook-user-ordered-remove-photo-breastfeeding-mum.html [https://
perma.cc/2K3H-FYAQ].
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rithms take posts at face value.188 The algorithms consider only what
is being said, paying little regard to the post’s purpose or what it actu-
ally communicates to the platform’s audience. For this reason, algo-
rithms have proven consistently incapable of understanding linguistic
nuances such as humor and sarcasm.189
Because algorithms are not perfect, there is often a call for more
human content moderation to ensure platforms remove harmful con-
tent but do not wrongfully censor harmless—or even socially benefi-
cial—content. Although humans are often in a better position than a
machine to determine whether speech is prohibited by community
standards, this too is an imperfect solution. Human moderators also
struggle with difficult decisions and apply community standards incon-
sistently—a product of vague guidelines, broad discretion, and their
own subjective biases.190 In addition, social platforms rely on humans
to make decisions about speech that often straddle the line between
permissible and impermissible. Unless they are trained attorneys,
human moderators continuously struggle with decisions over what is
or is not legally harmful speech.191
In addition, when it comes to certain types of harmful content such
as violence and nudity, viewing hours of disturbing content takes a
heavy psychological toll on human moderators.192 In fact, some of the
major social networks are now mandating that their employees sign
forms, acknowledging that their work as content moderators could
cause PTSD.193 As a result, platforms increasingly rely on algorithms
to remove this content without human review.194 Despite their indi-
vidual shortcomings, the joint efforts of algorithmic and human con-
188. Ben Dickson, Why AI Is Terrible at Content Moderation, MAGZTER (Sept.
2019), https://www.magzter.com/article/Science/PC-Magazine/Why-AI-Is-Terrible-At-
Content-Moderation [https://perma.cc/ZF8K-544J].
189. See Vincent, supra note 181.
190. See Jillian C. York & Corynne McSherry, Content Moderation Is Broken. Let
Us Count the Ways., EFF (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/con-
tent-moderation-broken-let-us-count-ways [https://perma.cc/8ZNQ-XYSH]; Daisy So-
derberg-Rivkin, Opinion, When It Comes to Content Moderation, We’ve Been
Focusing on the Wrong Type of Bias, MORNING CONSULT (Dec. 5, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://morningconsult.com/opinions/when-it-comes-to-content-moderation-weve-
been-focusing-on-the-wrong-type-of-bias/ [https://perma.cc/Z3DB-6AXQ].
191. See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J.
1353, 1361–62 (2018).
192. Alex Hern, Revealed: Catastrophic Effects of Working As a Facebook Modera-
tor, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 17, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/
sep/17/revealed-catastrophic-effects-working-facebook-moderator [https://perma.cc/
X63Y-AEBM].
193. Facebook and YouTube Moderators Sign PTSD Disclosure, BBC NEWS (Jan.
25, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51245616 [https://perma.cc/CMQ2-
4BSY].
194. Vincent, supra note 181.
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tent moderators present the most effective approach to fighting online
abuses in light of the current technology available.195
B. Models for Content Regulation
Unlike the methods for moderating content, which rely on a combi-
nation of algorithmic and human decision-making, there are three dif-
ferent models for making determinations about how content is
moderated. Under the current model, platforms are responsible for
devising their own content moderation systems. It would be inaccu-
rate to describe this as a “zero-regulation” framework, given that plat-
forms engage in a fair amount of content moderation, as discussed
above, but this system of self-regulation allows platforms incredible
discretion over moderating content. The way social platforms have ex-
ercised this discretion has led to calls for increased governance, partic-
ularly for policies related to the spread of misinformation and hate
speech. As discussed in Part II.B, several lawmakers and commenta-
tors have suggested reforming section 230 to achieve these policy
goals, and others—including Facebook’s co-founder and CEO Mark
Zuckerberg—have called for direct government regulation over social
media.196 There also exists a third regulatory option to achieve the
reduction of speech harms online—an industry-wide self-governance
model.
Thus, the three distinct models are: (1) the current model of self-
regulation, where platforms devise individual schemes for content
moderation; (2) the government regulation model; and (3) the indus-
try-wide self-governance model. This Part will offer a high-level over-
view of each model.
1. Self-Regulation: Content Moderation That Is Too Small
Despite the fact that social platforms are not legally required to en-
gage in content moderation, there are important normative and eco-
nomic considerations that create incentives to self-regulate. Although
social platforms remain free from government regulation, self-regula-
tion is inherently a model of private regulation.197 This model would
likely gain support if there existed public certainty that social plat-
forms did all in their power to remove harmful speech, and if there
was a consensus regarding what constitutes harmful speech. The chal-
195. See Dickson, supra note 188; see also Kalev Leetaru, Why We Still Need
Human Moderators in an AI-Powered World, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2018, 9:42 AM), https:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2018/09/08/why-we-still-need-human-moderators-
in-an-ai-powered-world/#7df900541412 [https://perma.cc/P98W-PX5D].
196. Zuckerberg claimed government regulation is necessary “in four areas: harm-
ful content, election integrity, privacy and data portability.” Zuckerberg, supra note
30.
197. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1662 (referring to private social platforms as sys-
tems of governance).
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lenge is that neither condition exists: social platforms moderate con-
tent with little transparency,198 and there is no clear consensus over
what speech meets a threshold level of harmful to warrant removal.199
The first challenge could be easily solved, but at a cost social plat-
forms have to date been unwilling to bear.
This lack of transparency is problematic because there is no way to
hold a platform accountable when the public does not know the deci-
sions guiding its moderation practices. “Every time someone uses
search or social media services, [they are] relying on a secret and pro-
prietary algorithm tuned to maximize something—usually user en-
gagement with the service. Transparency and accountability are
largely absent.”200 Instead, the public is told, “Trust us, the engineers
are working on it,”201 which does little to inspire confidence given that
social platforms constantly struggle with moderation decisions and
speech harms still abound online. The lack of transparency breeds an
additional problem because when it is not clear what social platforms
are actually doing, there is no meaningful way to engage in a discus-
sion about whether platforms are doing enough.
Another challenge with the self-regulation framework is that the
business model for social platforms—which prioritizes engagement of
as many users as possible—also favors controversy.202 Any content
that evokes emotion—good or bad—stimulates user engagement.203
As a result, even harmful posts inciting negative emotions such as
198. Rebecca MacKinnon, Facebook Is Part of an Industry-Wide Problem: Lack of
Transparency About Policies Affecting Users’ Online Rights, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RE-
SOURCE CENTRE (April 25, 2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/facebook-
is-part-of-an-industry-wide-problem-lack-of-transparency-about-policies-affecting-
users%E2%80%99-online-rights [https://perma.cc/V358-R5XC]; Prerna Juneja,
Deepika Rama Subramanian & Tanushree Mitra, Through the Looking Glass: Study
of Transparency in Reddit’s Moderation Practices, 4 PACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERAC-
TION, Jan. 2020, at 3 (demonstrating an in-depth study conducted on Redditt’s content
moderation with results revealing a lack of transparency in moderation practices);
David Siegel & Rob Reich, Opinion, It’s Not Too Late for Social Media to Regulate
Itself, WIRED (Feb. 7, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/its-not-too-late-
for-social-media-to-regulate-itself/ [https://perma.cc/AC5Q-V2BZ].
199. See generally Claire Wardle, Challenges of Content Moderation: Define
“Harmful Content”, INSTITUT MONTAIGNE (June 27, 2019), https://
www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/challenges-content-moderation-define-harmful-
content [https://perma.cc/FR4B-5HFM]. This is the ultimate hurdle to achieving a sys-
tem of workable content moderation. The threshold of what is harmful enough to
warrant removal is a question of line-drawing that reasonable people will differ on.
Not to mention the challenge of divorcing political biases from such moderation deci-
sions (considering the adage “one man’s freedom fighter on film is another man’s
terrorist”).
200. Id.
201. Siegel & Reich, supra note 198.
202. Brown, supra note 132, at 21.
203. Martin Jones, Emotional Engagement Is the Key to Viral Content Marketing,
COX BLUE, https://www.coxblue.com/emotional-engagement-is-the-key-to-viral-con
tent-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/54DH-DWLM].
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rage, fear, or disdain generate numerous shares on social media.204
Social networks are not only aware of this correlation, they actively
exploit it to maximize their profits.205 For example, when Facebook
learned how its algorithms contributed to polarizing its users, it elimi-
nated efforts to make the platform less divisive, because controversy
equals engagement.206 Contentious posts will necessarily engage users,
which may impact algorithmic decisions regarding display and promo-
tion of that post.207
This is not to say that social platforms have not made real strides
toward reducing harmful content; however, it is impossible to ignore
their prioritization of economic objectives.208 Social platforms, after
all, are profit-oriented organizations that rely on maximizing user en-
gagement to attract advertisers.209 But not all decisions are entirely
profit-driven. While certain decisions regarding the moderation of
harmful content may be viewed as a component of a broader Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (“CSR”), it would be more accurate to view
many decisions through a hybrid CSR-economic lens.210 Where mar-
ket forces and CSR align, the self-regulation model works to remove
harmful speech. Actions (or inactions) that alienate users could drive
down potential advertising revenue, so social platforms have “devel-
oped an intricate system to both take down content their users don’t
want to see and keep up as much content as possible.”211 Many plat-
forms have long emphasized their free speech values, but have had to
weigh these “against competing principles of user safety, harm to
users, public relations concerns . . . and the revenue implications of
certain content for advertisers.”212
The current decentralized nature of self-governance has created op-
portunities for each platform to make the best content decisions for its
204. Id.
205. Jeff Horwitz & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Executives Shut Down Efforts







208. Klonick, supra note 9, at 1627.
209. Barrie Sander, Freedom of Expression in the Age of Online Platforms: The
Promise and Pitfalls of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Content Moderation, 43
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 939, 953 (2020) (“Increasing user engagement is financially lu-
crative for online platforms: as users spend more time and attention on their sites,
platforms can collect ever more behavioral data, improve their targeted advertising
and engagement capabilities, and grow their advertising revenue.”).
210. Klonick, supra note 9, at 1627 (“Though corporate responsibility is a noble
aim, the primary reason companies take down obscene and violent material is the
threat that allowing such material poses to potential profits based in advertising
revenue.”).
211. Id. at 1664.
212. Id. at 1626.
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particular users. This enables social media sites to take unique ap-
proaches to striking their desired balance of “figur[ing] out new ap-
proaches or rules that would still satisfy concerned users and
encourage them to connect and interact on the platform.”213 The
model has allowed platforms to individually curate content in ways
that make the most sense for their users:
This decentralization allows some sites to focus on providing an ex-
perience that feels safe, or entertaining, or suitable for kids, while
others aim to foster debate, or create an objective encyclopedia, or
maintain an archive of videos documenting war crimes. Each of
these is a distinct and laudable goal, but each requires different con-
tent standards and moderation practices.214
Such goals are possible given the lack of government control. This
inherent flexibility has also meant that some platforms take more ag-
gressive approaches against harmful speech while others do little.215
Unsurprisingly, social platforms tend to invest resources in remov-
ing harmful speech when doing so offers a clear economic benefit.216
For example, up until 2015, terrorist organizations openly exploited
social platforms like Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook to organize, re-
cruit, fundraise, and inspire violence.217 Initially, these platforms were
slow to react, but their receiving threats of legal action from around
the world tipped the needle.218 Beginning in 2015, a series of lawsuits
emerged against social platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, and
YouTube, alleging that by allowing terrorist groups to use their plat-
forms, the social media companies were providing material support to
terrorists.219 Although section 230 immunized platforms against these
claims, the lawsuits both shined a spotlight on these abuses and in-
creased public calls for meaningful change.220
213. Id.
214. Emma Llanso, Platforms Want Centralized Censorship. That Should Scare
You., WIRED (Apr. 18, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/platforms-cen-
tralized-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/97RQ-ZZSA].
215. Brown, supra note 132, at 10.
216. Klonick, supra note 9, at 1627 (explaining how companies remove harmful
content when refraining from doing so could adversely affect profits).
217. Brown, supra note 132, at 7.
218. Id. at 9, 11–12.
219. Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 619 (6th Cir. 2019); Force v. Facebook,
Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2019); Taamneh v. Twitter, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 904,
908 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Copeland v. Twitter, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 965, 968 (N.D. Cal.
2018); Clayborn v. Twitter, Inc., No. 17-cv-06894-LB, 2018 WL 6839754, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 31, 2018); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 147 (E.D.N.Y.
2017); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Pennie
v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874, 879 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Cain v. Twitter, Inc., 17 Civ.
122 (PAC), 2017 WL 1489220, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2017); Fields v. Twitter, Inc.,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
220. Klonick, supra note 9, at 1604; see Julia Greenberg, Twitter Wants You to
Know That It Is Fighting Terrorists, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2016, 3:18 PM), https://
www.wired.com/2016/02/twitter-wants-you-to-know-that-it-is-fighting-terrorists/
[https://perma.cc/2JU4-UE5L].
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Twitter, reluctant to be seen as a tool of the government, initially
took a completely hands-off approach, refusing to remove even those
users requested by the U.S. government on the basis of their identifi-
cation and designation as terrorists.221 This began to change when
governments around the world unrestrained by the First Amendment,
particularly the European Union, applied legal pressure on platforms
to do more to remove terrorist speech.222 This was likely Twitter’s im-
petus in 2016, when it changed course and began to dramatically in-
crease the number of accounts it suspended for promoting
terrorism.223 Facebook also began actively policing terrorists’ abuse of
its service by removing millions of posts.224 YouTube, arguably the top
recruitment platform for terrorist networks, which had initially strug-
gled to respond to the dissemination of terrorist content, eventually
developed a more successful strategy for fighting the spread of its
propaganda.225 Eventually, these platforms, along with Microsoft, en-
gaged in a collaborative effort to reduce extreme and egregious ter-
rorist content online.226
These efforts to stem terrorist organizations’ abuse of social plat-
forms can be viewed as advancing both CSR and economic objectives:
by committing resources to addressing a global challenge, they
demonstrate corporate accountability and at the same time send a sig-
nal to users that they are working to maintain a safe online space.227
But they also achieve an important goal of mitigating the threat of
costly governmental sanctions.228
That there is not always perfect alignment between economic and
CSR goals is a significant drawback to a model of self-regulation.229
221. Brown, supra note 132, at 10–11.
222. See Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 507–09
(2020).
223. Greenberg, supra note 220; Queenie Wong, Twitter Cracks Down on Accounts
Promoting Terrorism, MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 20, 2017, 3:51 AM), https://
www.mercurynews.com/2017/09/19/twitter-cracks-down-on-accounts-promoting-ter-
rorism/ [https://perma.cc/3BD3-9MKP].
224. Id.; Tony Romm & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Says It Removed a Flood of
Hate Speech, Terrorist Propaganda and Fake Accounts from Its Site, WASH. POST
(Nov. 15, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/11/15/
facebook-says-it-removed-flood-hate-speech-terrorist-propaganda-fake-accounts-its-
site/ [https://perma.cc/7WXV-EXDF].
225. Rita Katz, To Curb Terrorist Propaganda Online, Look to YouTube. No, Re-
ally., WIRED (Oct. 28, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/to-curb-terrorist-
propaganda-online-look-to-youtube-no-really/ [https://perma.cc/FMM6-9ZYP].
226. GLOBAL INTERNET FORUM TO COUNTER TERRORISM, https://www.gifct.org/
[https://perma.cc/QT4X-3R9G].
227. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1626–27.
228. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 746 (Alito, J., dissenting) (2012)
(“The constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment can tolerate sanctions
against calculated falsehood without significant impairment of their essential func-
tion.” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)) (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis in original)).
229. See Siegel & Reich, supra note 198.
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“History teaches us that unregulated marketplaces can produce a race
to the bottom, externalizing harms while socializing these costs and
privatizing the financial gains.”230 In this case, the negative externali-
ties are borne not by the social platforms but by their users.231 When
social platforms promote division, false information, hate speech, or
other harmful speech, their users bear the cost.232 This is why a frame-
work that leaves content moderation entirely up to social platforms is
inherently problematic. Without any accountability or oversight, it of-
fers no framework at all. The temptation to prioritize profits at the
expense of all else is simply too great, and this is part of the driving
call to lawmakers for legislative change.233
2. Government Regulation: Content Moderation That
Goes Too Big
Just as there are a variety of models of private regulation, so too are
there a variety of options for government-led content regulation.
Lawmakers have already tried to advance frameworks where over-
sight could come from the FTC or FCC234 and section 230 reform,235
although no meaningful regulation yet exists. Without a clear pro-
posed regulatory framework it is impossible to determine whether ef-
forts to regulate would survive the requisite constitutional
challenges.236 For example, analyzing a law that would restrict a plat-
form’s ability to remove content connected to certain ideological view-
points would be fundamentally different than an analysis requiring a
platform to take down posts on the basis of their content. Despite the
fact that it is inherently difficult to speculate about a generic model
for government regulation—given that the framework is undefined—
there are general benefits and drawbacks of government involvement
in this space that merit discussion.
Perhaps the most obvious benefit is that government regulation cre-
ates a level of accountability that is absent in any system of self-regu-
lation. Instead of merely encouraging platforms to engage, through
use of CSR or economic goals, government regulation would mandate
that platforms curate content in a specific manner or suffer the attend-
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake
News” and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1244 (2018) (discussing
how negative market externalities justify regulation in that “the market activities are
platforms chasing profits without exercising gatekeeping or transparency responsibili-
ties, and the externalities are costs borne by social media users in their roles as voters
and participants in civic life”).
232. See id.
233. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1626; see Newton, supra note 18.
234. Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
235. See supra Part II.B (discussing how numerous legislators and commentators
suggested amending section 230 to limit platform immunity).
236. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1606–07 (describing some of the constitutional
challenges identified by lawmakers and courts).
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ant consequence.237 In addition, this approach would centralize gov-
ernance in a comprehensive manner—all social platforms would be
required to curate content to eliminate or reduce particular harms.
Government regulation would vindicate a public interest for those
who assert that content on social media has led to violence and
harm,238 and thus government involvement is warranted.239 Particu-
larly among those who argue that social platforms demonstrate a bias
against conservative views, an additional argument in favor of govern-
ment regulation is that social platforms should not be in complete con-
trol over the content users see.
Yet, benefits that may be achieved in a model of government regu-
lation are overwhelmed by significant drawbacks. First and foremost is
that government efforts to regulate speech online on the basis of its
content would likely run afoul of the First Amendment.240 As previ-
ously discussed, the First Amendment protects a platform’s decisions
in moderating the speech it allows to be posted, promotes, or declines
to display.241 A regulatory framework requiring social platforms to
treat content in a particular manner would be presumptively unconsti-
tutional, and could be justified only if it met the highest level of judi-
cial review: strict scrutiny.242 Of course, strict scrutiny “requires the
Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling inter-
est and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”243 Could some
categories of harmful speech decried by commentators and lawmakers
survive a strict scrutiny analysis? Possibly, for speech that falls within
an unprotected category of speech, such as “incitement, . . . defama-
tion, speech integral to criminal conduct, . . . [or] true threats.”244 But
there are no assurances that such a law would survive, given that other
237. Id. at 1626 (discussing how CSR and economic goals are the two main mo-
tivators for company change); see Brown & Peters, supra note 4, at 530–31 (explaining
how model legislation like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and current notice-
and-takedown law in Germany show what Congress could implement to control
platforms).
238. Wood & Ravel, supra note 231 (explaining the harms that users experience
when companies fail to remove information).
239. See Siegel & Reich, supra note 198 (discussing the call for change and greater
regulation).
240. Brown & Peters, supra note 4, at 532–33.
241. Id.; see also supra Part II.
242. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) (striking down the
COPA); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (striking down a portion of the
CDA).
243. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015) (quoting Ariz. Free
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011)).
244. See Louis W. Tompros, Richard A. Crudo, Alexis Pfeiffer & Rahel Boghos-
sian, The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social Networking
Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65,
89–90 (2017) (noting that when “the regulated speech falls within a circumscribed
category, the Court most often submits the regulation to rational basis review, a
highly deferential standard under which a law is almost always upheld”).
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efforts to punish online speech in unprotected categories have not al-
ways been successful.245
Beyond First Amendment concerns, there is an ancillary threat to
speech that arises from legislating around permissible speech. Re-
quirements to remove certain speech will have the practical effect of
removing any speech adjacent to the prohibited category. Particularly
where the lines between permissible and impermissible speech are dif-
ficult to draw—which is true for many speech harms—incentives are
stacked in favor of takedown. For example, “content moderation
aimed at terrorist propaganda can sweep in news reporting, political
protest, documentary footage, and more.”246 One need look no fur-
ther than the DMCA for an example of overenforcement in response
to a notice-and-takedown system. Although the DMCA “relieves sec-
ondary parties of monitoring duties” upon prompt removal of flagged
content, it also tends to “incentivize overenforcement, especially when
it is difficult or costly to evaluate whether a user’s conduct is actiona-
ble.”247 For this reason, the DMCA’s “regime is widely criticized for
allowing ‘take-down’ without adequate proof of the underlying in-
fringement.”248 The reverse outcome would be true for regulatory
frameworks that would punish platforms for over-moderating content
to promote (or demote) a particular political viewpoint. The risk of
over-moderation in violation of the law could induce social platforms
to reduce those efforts altogether.
Perhaps the greatest concern with government regulation is that it
could be abused and employed as a political tool aimed at advancing
the administration’s interest. The Trump administration’s May 28,
2020 executive order serves as an example. Just days after Twitter ad-
ded a fact-check label to two of former-President Trump’s misleading
tweets about mail-in voting, he reacted by developing a framework for
regulation that, if not complied with, could ostensibly result in losing
section 230 immunity. Despite the fact that the order was rife with
legal hurdles, the point was to send a clear message to social plat-
forms: any effort to limit or frame the President’s speech, even when
false and potentially damaging, will be met with aggressive legal ac-
tion. This type of abuse is the ultimate concern with vesting regulatory
authority for content on social platforms with the government. In-
deed, one of the core justifications for the speech freedoms within the
First Amendment was a “pervasive and deep-seated mistrust of gov-
245. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 673 (holding that the COPA was likely unconsti-
tutional because it categorically banned the distribution of content harmful to minors
to anyone under seventeen for commercial purposes).
246. Llanso, supra note 214.
247. Madeline Byrd & Katherine J. Strandburg, CDA 230 for a Smart Internet, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 431 (2019); Reid, supra note 53, at 105 (“In this haze, ISPs are R
incentivized to over-block and err on the side of removing content—including lawful
content.”).
248. Byrd & Strandburg, supra note 247, at 431 (2019).
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ernment.”249 Although the online marketplace of ideas contains dam-
aging and dangerous speech, allowing the government to control that
marketplace is a greater threat.250
Indeed, the Internet, and in particular social platforms, have been
viewed as democratic frontiers: places where everyone has the oppor-
tunity to speak and have access to unfiltered ideas. It was idealized as
a place where “[n]ews and information would no longer be mediated
by newspaper editors, television producers and other gatekeepers. In-
stead, social media would allow direct access to individual voices in a
feed custom-built by the user.”251 Allowing government regulation
would unravel the promise of the Internet as a medium for the free
exchange of thoughts and ideas.252
Finally, government regulation of social platforms likely comes with
great administrative costs for both the social platforms and the gov-
ernment. Even where platforms utilize algorithms to make initial con-
tent determinations, some level of human content moderation—
arguably a significant level—will likely be necessary, given the com-
plexity and nuances of speech. Large social media companies, like
Facebook and YouTube, may easily bear these administrative costs,
but these costs will be challenging if not impossible for emerging and
smaller platforms to meet. Certainly, high costs of complying with reg-
ulations would discourage new platforms from entering the market, in
turn stifling competition and encouraging monopolies.
Given the barriers to government regulation and the insufficiency
of self-regulation, it is necessary to find another solution to address
the significant concerns related to the proliferation of harmful speech
online.
3. Industry Governance: Content Moderation That Is
Just and Right
A regulatory option at the industry level presents an opportunity to
avoid many of the challenges inherent in the decentralized and gov-
ernment-led frameworks. Among the industries that use such a model,
self-regulatory councils (“SRC”)253 generally exist either in place of
249. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Free Speech Paternalism and Free Speech Excep-
tionalism: Pervasive Distrust of Government and the Contemporary First Amendment,
76 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 679 (2015).
250. Id. (“[T]he greater threat comes not from private actions that distort the mar-
ketplace of ideas, but rather from state interventions to shape it.”).
251. Peter Suderman, Opinion, The Slippery Slope of Regulating Social Media, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/opinion/the-slippery-
slope-of-regulating-social-media.html [https://perma.cc/5VSY-CML6].
252. Id.
253. In the context of this Article, “self-regulatory council” does not refer to “self-
regulatory organizations,” the narrowly defined term from securities laws, but is used
more broadly to refer to a self-regulatory body composed of designates from compa-
nies, government, academics, and interest groups across a particular industry.
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government regulation or as a form of co-governance. As an indepen-
dent body with members, these organizations generally do not require
governmental authority to enforce their regulations, as they have
built-in enforcement mechanisms. These SRCs are often established
to develop standards and protocols that promote order and efficiency
across the industry and can be particularly useful in industries—like
social media—where public trust is low.254 Perhaps more importantly,
when executed effectively, they can stave off impending government
regulation. The Advertising Self-Regulatory Council (“ASRC”)
serves as a useful example of both purposes.255
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, public opinion about advertising
shifted from positive or mixed attitudes to negative perceptions ac-
companied by significant mistrust of the industry. 256 At the same
time, there was an increase in legislation designed to protect consum-
ers and the executive branch, which made greater regulation of the
advertising industry forthcoming.257 To respond to the public distrust
and impending new regulations—which advertisers were anxious to
avoid—the industry adopted the ASRC as a self-regulation mecha-
nism that included meaningful reforms.258 The upshot was that there
was an “inverse correlation between the rise of [the ASRC] and the
diminution of criticism and government interest in advertising.”259
The ASRC is not the only SRC that serves as a buffer between in-
dustry and government on the one side and the public on the other.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) is a non-
governmental organization that aims to protect investors and the mar-
kets by regulating both member firms and exchange markets.260 The
American Bar Association (“ABA”) puts forth Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct that “serve as models for the ethics rules of most
jurisdictions.”261 It also accredits law schools and is thus able to con-
254. See, e.g., John D’Antona, FINRA Reins in High-Risk Brokers, MKTS. MEDIA
(June 6, 2017), https://www.marketsmedia.com/finra-approves-proposals-control-high-
risk-brokers/ [https://perma.cc/MF67-MJ9W] (noting that FINRA’s regulatory efforts
are necessary to improve public trust in the historically distrusted industry of
stockbroking).
255. Advertising Self-Regulatory Council, TRUTH IN ADVERT., https://www.truthin
advertising.org/national-advertising-review-council-narc/ [https://perma.cc/QN9G-
4GMB].
256. Eric J. Zanot, The National Advertising Review Board, 1971–1976, 59 JOUR-





260. About FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., https://www.finra.org/about
[https://perma.cc/6HPR-GAWJ].
261. Model Rules of Professional Conduct: About the Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/ [https://perma.cc/SP3H-JHD4].
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trol parameters of what constitutes an acceptable legal education.262
Other SRC examples include the National Association of Realtors
and the American Medical Association. SRCs vary in both organiza-
tional structure and operation—some, like FINRA, operate under the
authority of a government agency, while others, such as the ASRC,
are independent from government but refer cases to the FTC.263
The ASRC provides a useful regulatory model for social platforms
that could have widespread appeal for three main reasons. First, social
platforms might be able to avoid cumbersome government regulation
and potentially have not just input but some control over self-govern-
ance. Second, users of social platforms would benefit from an en-
hanced user experience because of clearly defined SRC policies and
grievance processes. Even if the SRC standards for moderating con-
tent, removing harmful speech, and responding to content concerns
were too restrictive or liberal for individual users’ preferences, it
would still be a significant improvement over the current systems and
practices because the SRC would have clearly defined expectations
and processes for platforms that users could rely on. Finally, the gov-
ernment would directly benefit from SRC management of content
regulation for two reasons. First, the SRC would advance the govern-
ment’s interest in reducing harm without the problem of the govern-
ment regulating speech—which would be constitutionally
problematic. Second, SRC management would help conserve limited
government resources by deferring regulation to an industry that is
likely more capable of regulating its members than a government
agency. An SRC built for social platforms can not only avoid problem-
atic government involvement in speech determinations but can also
provide the right incentive for social media companies to reduce
known harms.
The Social Platform Regulatory Council (“SPRC”) thus proposed
could work in myriad ways, but I suggest four basic structural ele-
ments. First, and most importantly, the SPRC needs incentives to
draw a high rate of voluntary industry participation. Second, the
SPRC board needs to have the right composition. Third, members of
the SPRC must be required to demonstrate accountability to a set of
shared principles. Fourth, SPRC oversight must have teeth.
a. The Need for Voluntary Participation
The SPRC must offer benefits to participants that encourage volun-
tary participation, particularly considering that membership demands
262. Frequently Asked Questions, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/legal_education/resources/frequently_asked_questions/ [https://perma.cc/
RRF5-QXD9].
263. See Advertising Self-Regulatory Council, supra note 255 (stating the ASRC
“‘may’ refer cases of untruthful or deceptive advertising claims to the appropriate
governmental regulatory authority”).
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that social platforms commit to meeting enhanced ethical, and not le-
gal, obligations. The desire to avoid government regulation and im-
prove public perception may be enough. The National Advertising
Division of the Better Business Bureau (“NAD”), one of the self-reg-
ulatory units of the ASRC,264 has a high rate of voluntary industry
participation for just these reasons.265 The NAD is charged with pro-
viding independent self-regulation by overseeing the truthfulness of
advertising.266 The NAD accepts complaints from competitors about
deceptive advertising claims, and advertisers participate in the NAD’s
arbitration processes because to do otherwise risks both adverse pub-
licity and referral to the FTC.267 An added benefit is that “allowing
competitor challenges transforms the self-regulatory process into one
that takes place in a competitive and adversarial, rather than collusive,
forum and encourages a high degree of participation.”268
But benefits beyond avoiding government regulation and improving
public perception could encourage social platform participation in the
SPRC. Cooperation across the social media landscape could result in
efficiencies for the industry, innovation, and the dissemination of use-
ful information, which ultimately benefit both users and the social
platforms themselves. Working together, it may be easier for plat-
forms, particularly smaller and less-funded platforms, to manage some
of the more challenging content issues. A working example of this is
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (“GIFCT”), which
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube founded in 2017 to further
address terrorist abuses of their digital platforms by sharing informa-
tion and collaborating to facilitate identifying and blocking terrorist
content.269
Additionally, membership in a legitimate SPRC avoids concerns
that a social media company’s purported efforts to address harmful
speech are simply window dressing. This was the case with Facebook’s
recently announced independent Oversight Board. Facebook devel-
oped its Board with twenty initial members to “rule on difficult con-
tent issues, such as whether specific Facebook or Instagram posts
constitute hate speech. Some of its rulings will be binding; other will
264. The National Advertising Review Council Is Now the Advertising Self-Regula-
tory Council, BBB NAT’L PROGRAMS: NEWSROOM (Apr. 23), https://bbbp-
rograms.org/archive/the-national-advertising-review-council-is-now-the-advertising-
self-regulatory-council [https://perma.cc/BXL9-2NJB].




267. John E. Villafranco & Katherine E. Riley, So You Want to Self-Regulate? The
National Advertising Division as Standard Bearer, 27 ANTITRUST 79, 79–80.
268. Id. at 80.
269. Llanso, supra note 214.
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be considered ‘guidance.’”270 However, the Board has been roundly
criticized as a “high-priced fig leaf”271 and vested with no real
power.272 Instead of offering meaningful reform, the Board, which is
funded entirely by Facebook itself, has been criticized as one that “will
have no influence over anything that really matters in the world.”273
One reason for this concern is that the Board’s purpose is largely to
oversee whether Facebook’s content enforcement decisions are con-
sistent with the company’s content policies and values.274 Thus, the
Board lacks oversight of the company’s content policies and values
themselves, and instead simply issues just advisory opinions on pol-
icy.275 In addition, because Facebook hand selected the Board, “it
risks becoming stacked with members who would be too deferential to
the company.”276 To be effective, any oversight board would need to
be made up of a diverse and well-rounded group of experts that could
make decisions independent from the regulated companies.
b. The Need for a Diverse and Well-Versed Board of Experts
An objection that often arises in self-regulatory efforts is with re-
spect to competition and anti-monopoly concerns. In an industry that
is already perceived as having monopolistic practices, it is critically
important to avoid governance that represents and advocates for the
interests of large social platforms. Impartiality with respect to individ-
ual platforms is essential. To ensure meaningful efforts at self-regula-
tion, the SPRC’s leadership board must represent diverse and global
interests regarding content moderation. It needs to include people
who represent a variety of disciplines, including experts on free ex-
270. Margaret Sullivan, Facebook Has a Huge Truth Problem. A High-Priced





272. Id.; Dipayan Ghosh, Facebook’s Oversight Board Is Not Enough, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/facebooks-oversight-board-is-not-enough
[https://perma.cc/XR3P-NXPB]; John Naughton, Opinion, Facebook’s ‘Oversight
Board’ Is Proof That It Wants To Be Regulated – By Itself, THE GUARDIAN (May 16,
2020, 11:01), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/16/facebooks-
oversight-board-is-proof-that-it-wants-to-be-regulated-by-itself [https://perma.cc/
YV9L-UXP4]; Siva Vaidhyanathan, Facebook and the Folly of Self-Regulation,
WIRED (May 9, 2020, 2:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-and-the-folly-
of-self-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/2ADP-WRAZ].
273. Vaidhyanathan, supra note 272.
274. Oversight Board Charter, FACEBOOK 5 (Sept. 2019), https://about.fb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6WS-3RV8].
275. Natasha Lomas, Meet Facebook’s Latest Fake, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 21, 2019,
12:56 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/21/meet-facebooks-latest-fake/ [https://
perma.cc/75F6-25HG].
276. Mark Latonero, Can Facebook’s Oversight Board Win People’s Trust?, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan. 29, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/01/can-facebooks-oversight-board-win-
peoples-trust [https://perma.cc/Z2HF-YD62].
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pression, activists, lawyers, scholars, human rights leaders, linguists,
business leaders, and, of course, members of social platforms. Criti-
cally, the SPRC cannot have an outsized presence of the large and
powerful social media companies, such as Facebook/Instagram, You-
Tube/Google, or Twitter, or only the interests of those large corpora-
tions would be represented as the interests of the entire industry.
As modeled by the ASRC, the SPRC could have several subdivi-
sions, each responsible for a discrete area where board members have
particular expertise. A benefit is that the board would not need to
limit itself to just decisions regarding content moderation but could
potentially address concerns related to privacy, disclosure obligations,
advertising, and more.
c. The Need for Accountability to a Set of Shared Principles
Without accountability to a set of shared principles fixed in a gen-
eral code of conduct, an SPRC for social platforms would be meaning-
less. Shared principles would include commitments to reducing
harmful speech online, responding to notifications of problematic con-
tent in established timeframes, responding to user appeals, and com-
mitments to operating within certain user agreements. This would
include the establishment of industry-wide baselines, allowing for
some level of independence for platform decisions, but not without
adequate safeguards. For example, social platforms could be required
to submit plans and policies to the SPRC, which determines compli-
ance with industry guidelines, and then provides approval. Shared
principles could also differ across geographic regions and provide gui-
dance to members beyond legal considerations, making recommenda-
tions based on cultural values and societal norms.
Accountability demands transparency so that the SPRC has a
meaningful opportunity to determine whether there has been compli-
ance. Transparency can be limited to complete disclosure with the
SPRC and not the general public. Yet the shared principles and deci-
sions reached by the SPRC must be publicly reported to maintain
public confidence in the self-regulatory body.
d. The Need for Consequences to Compel Adherence
In order for the SPRC model to have a chance of success, it must
have teeth. This means that instead of pure self-regulation, there
likely needs to be a nexus to a government agency—which would not
provide oversight, but would offer an enforcement mechanism when
the SPRC deems it necessary.277 And this enforcement mechanism
277. See Wood & Ravel, supra note 231, at 1245–46 (noting that it is not uncommon
for government agencies to “provide legal backstops to the self-regulation negotiated
by industry participants, along with imposition of civil or criminal penalties on
violators”).
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must be coupled with penalties sufficient enough to induce compli-
ance. If not from the government, outside enforcement could come
from an outside organization that offers third-party oversight of the
self-regulatory system. Either way, there needs to be a tangible conse-
quence for non-compliance such that even large and well-funded so-
cial platforms would be encouraged to adhere to established standards
and practices.
The SPRC should promote adjudicatory processes with procedures
that encourage broad participation. One way to ensure this is to insu-
late participants who adhere to guidelines from enforcement actions
by the government agency or third-party responsible for enforcement.
The SPRC should also incorporate an appeals system for individual
platform users to contribute to goals of public trust. In essence, the
SPRC would need to be able to act swiftly to address concerns yet
offer due process to members.
Importantly, nearly every benefit of self-regulation would apply in
the SPRC model, yet the drawbacks are entirely removed. This model
empowers those who know and understand the platforms’ algorithmic
models to work with those that research harms from speech on plat-
forms to quickly respond and adjust to needs. It balances the need to
address harms without impermissible and undesirable government
involvement.
IV. CONCLUSION
In an industry defined by increasing technological growth, users,
and user-generated content, there is no perfect solution to addressing
the incidence and proliferation of speech harms. Relying on the gov-
ernment to regulate this space creates real threats of abuse and likely
fatal First Amendment hurdles. Yet leaving control to social platforms
has not worked given their track record of prioritizing economic con-
cerns at the expense of all other considerations. At a time when public
confidence in social platforms is low and government interests in pur-
suing regulation is high, an opportunity exists to create a self-regula-
tory council that can meaningfully regulate this space. But the success
of an industry-wide self-governing model necessarily depends on in-
centives to participate, mechanisms for enforcement, and penalties for
failure to comply.
Adopting this model would promote order and efficiency within the
industry and appeal to citizens and lawmakers who have been calling
for change while avoiding hasty and problematic government regula-
tion. This would also have the positive effect of separating the debate
about section 230 from the challenges of regulating social platforms.
Such a solution avoids most of the challenges inherent in the decen-
tralized and government-led frameworks and would likely result in ef-
ficiencies within the industry, innovation, and the dissemination of
useful information, which ultimately benefit both users and the social
platforms themselves.
